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Proportionality and Prosecutorial Discretion:
Challenges to the Constitutionality of Georgia's
Death Penalty Laws and Procedures Amidst
the Deficiencies of the State's Mandatory
Appellate Review Structure
KRISTEN NUGENTt
Beginning with the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Furman v.
Georgia' and Gregg v. Georgia,2 challenges to the death-penalty laws,
policies, and procedures of the State of Georgia have shaped the consti-
tutional jurisprudence applicable to capital-punishment cases nation-
wide. Now, following the Supreme Court's recent denial of certiorari in
Walker v. Georgia'-in which Justice Stevens and Justice Thomas
expressed sharply divergent interpretations of the Court's precedent
regarding the importance of a thorough proportionality review to Geor-
gia's capital-sentencing scheme,4 and in which Justice Stevens empha-
sized that the Court's refusal to hear the case was the result of a
procedural technicality and not a decision on the merits'-the Court
once again seems poised to reexamine the constitutional implications of
Georgia's death-penalty statute and the manner in which it is imple-
mented. In anticipation of such an analysis, and in order to advocate that
the U.S. Supreme Court clarify its position in a way that aligns with its
longstanding tradition of requiring prudence and temperance in the
infliction of death, this article dissects the grave and constitutionally
impermissible flaws inhering in Georgia's current system of capital pun-
ishment, with a particular focus on the failures of the mandatory state
supreme court proportionality review.
The article thus begins with an assessment of Georgia's capital-
t Associate, King & Spalding; J.D., University of Virginia; B.A., University of Notre
Dame.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3. 129 S. Ct. 453 (2008) (mem.).
4. Compare id. at 483 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[U]nder this Court's precedents,
Georgia is not required to provide any proportionality review at all."), with id. at 454 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("Our decision in [Gregg] to uphold the later enacted statute was founded on an
understanding that the new procedures the statute prescribed would protect against the imposition
of death sentences influenced by impermissible factors such as race.").
5. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring) ("That [procedural] argument provides a legitimate basis
for this Court's decision to deny review. I write separately to emphasize that the Court's denial
has no precedential effect ....").
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
sentencing scheme, arguing that the language of the relevant statutes
renders the system susceptible to inequities among defendants and
abuses of discretion by state officials. Notably, the state supreme court's
automatic review of all death sentences, instituted as a means of
restraining overbroad judicial, juror, and prosecutorial application of
vague statutory text, has failed to provide any meaningful check on the
systemic arbitrariness and unfairness of death penalty decision making
that manifests at every stage of the criminal process. This point is elabo-
rated in the second section of the article, which focuses on potential
Eighth Amendment challenges to the practical application of Georgia's
death penalty laws. This section of the article contends that a meticulous
and comprehensive judicial proportionality review is integral to the
legitimacy of Georgia's procedures, and to the extent that the Georgia
court persists in providing only a cursory rendition of its obligation, the
entire institution of capital punishment within the state is unconstitu-
tional. Moreover, even assuming the validity of any arguments that the
U.S. Supreme Court's precedent is at all ambiguous with respect to the
significance of the mandatory review, the compendium of Eighth
Amendment death-penalty jurisprudence-with its dual emphasis on the
need for both consistency and restraint in the imposition of death by the
State-militates in favor of striking down a statutory scheme that offers
only superficial protections to capital defendants and that has repeatedly
proven deficient in its ability to limit the death penalty to only the most
extreme and atrocious cases.
The third and final segment of the article explores an alternative but
related set of challenges to Georgia's death-penalty procedures through
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. Specifically, this sec-
tion demonstrates how the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to fully attend
to the argument that Georgia's death-penalty statute, as applied, has fos-
tered opportunities for impermissible considerations, including race-
based biases (implicit or otherwise), to infiltrate the various stages of
criminal proceedings, thus exposing capital defendants to a heightened
risk that their sentence will be based on reasons irrelevant to their culpa-
bility. After showing that sophisticated statistical research supports the
assertion that Georgia's procedures are in fact flawed in ways that vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause, the article explains why allowing such
evidence to form the basis of a Fourteenth Amendment claim comports
with the Supreme Court's prior decisions. In particular, the article notes
that, notwithstanding the traditional deference given to the decisions of
district attorneys, the gross statistical disparities in the treatment of
defendants in white-victim versus black-victim cases surpass even the
most latitudinous conception of the appropriate bounds of prosecutorial
discretion.
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The article thus concludes by positing that the problems underlying
these Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment concerns are in
fact intertwined: a statutory scheme that grants district attorneys and
sentencing authorities virtually unconstrained discretion to decide
whether or not to impose the death penalty on a particular defendant can
be construed as facilitating acts of mercy only if one assumes that all
capital defendants were justifiably death eligible in the first instance.
Yet the Georgia statute is constructed such that more than a majority of
all persons accused of murder fall within the statutory "guidelines" for
capital punishment, and the whims and biases of judge or jury sentencers
and the political leanings and ambitions of county district attorneys will
determine with unavoidable inconsistency who is ultimately subjected to
death and who is spared. This is a striking contrast from the constitu-
tional mandate that death be applied sparingly but fairly, against only the
most dangerous and horrific killers.
Furthermore, the state supreme court proportionality review, which
was essential to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to uphold Georgia's
revised death-penalty statute (enacted after the Court struck down the
former version several years prior), has since deteriorated into a mere
perfunctory exercise. It neither shields death-row defendants from arbi-
trary and disproportionate sentencing in violation of the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment Clause nor rectifies the effects of institutionalized
racism and individual prosecutorial biases in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, as it was originally intended to do. Accordingly, this arti-
cle contends that when the U.S. Supreme Court fulfills its responsibility
to definitively resolve these issues-and as noted, dicta in recent opin-
ions indicates that such resolution may soon be forthcoming-the only
legally and morally justifiable position for the Court to take is to insist
that the Supreme Court of Georgia provide a thorough review of the
fairness and proportionality of each capital-punishment sentence; and
since the Georgia court has consistently proven unwilling or incapable
of doing so, the Supreme Court should strike down the state's death-
penalty law itself as unconstitutional.
I. GEORGIA'S CAPITAL-SENTENCING SCHEME
Georgia's criminal code is notable in that, unlike the laws of many
other jurisdictions, it makes no distinction between degrees of murder.
Instead, under Georgia law, "[a] person commits the offense of murder
when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or
implied, causes the death of another human being."6 In contrast to the
6. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(a) (2007 & Supp. 2009) (emphasis added). Express malice is
defined as the "deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of another human being which is
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laws of other states, which (if they sanction it at all) tend to limit capital
punishment to murder in the first degree,7 Georgia's statute provides that
any person "convicted of the offense of murder shall be punished by
death, by imprisonment for life without parole, or by imprisonment for
life."8 A Georgia defendant convicted of murder becomes death penalty
eligible upon a finding by the sentencing judge or jury of the existence
beyond a reasonable doubt of one or more statutory aggravating circum-
stances.9 Once a single statutory aggravating factor is found, the sen-
tencer may, but need not, recommend death, depending on its
consideration of any other existing mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. 10
If the judge or jury does find that the State proved at least one of
the enumerated aggravating circumstances and decides, in the exercise
of complete discretion, that the death penalty should be imposed, Geor-
gia law requires that the trial court transmit the entire record and tran-
script of the proceedings, along with a special report prepared by the
trial judge, to the state supreme court in order to facilitate appellate
review." In the course of this review, the state supreme court must
determine whether the death sentence "was imposed under the influence
of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor" and whether it "is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
manifested by external circumstances capable of proof." Id. § 16-5-1(b). Implied malice exists
"where no considerable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show
an abandoned and malignant heart." Id.
7. See TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2006-STASTICAL
TABLES tbl.1 (Dec. 14, 2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/html/cp/2006/
cp06st.pdf. As of 2006, among the thirty-eight states that maintain a capital punishment statute,
sixteen expressly define "first-degree murder" and impose death penalty eligibility only for that
offense: Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming. The vast majority of these states also require a finding of one or more aggravating
circumstances before capital punishment is an option. See id.
8. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(d) (Supp. 2009).
9. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(c) (2008). Of the eleven circumstances listed in the Georgia
code, several are very specific in their terms, limiting the respective class of defendants to which
each rightly could be applied. See, e.g., id. § 17-10-30(b)(1) (defendant had a prior record of
conviction for a capital felony); id. § 17-10-30(b)(9) (defendant was in or had escaped from the
lawful custody of a peace officer or a place of lawful confinement). Others, however, are
considerably more vague and susceptible to broad interpretations that could implicate a
disturbingly wide range of defendants. See, e.g., id. § 17-10-30(b)(3) (defendant "knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or
device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person"); id. § 17-10-
30(b)(4) (defendant murdered for the purposes of receiving money or anything of monetary
value); id. § 17-10-30(b)(7) ("The offense ...was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim[.]"
(emphasis added)).
10. Id. § 17-10-30(b).
11. Id. § 17-10-35(a).
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considering both the crime and the defendant."1 2 Under the statute, the
Supreme Court of Georgia is obligated to "include in its decision a refer-
ence to those similar cases which it took into consideration" and is
authorized to affirm the sentence of death or to set it aside and remand
the case, depending on its findings.1 3 In practice, however, this
mandatory review is consistently performed in a cursory manner and has
been widely criticized for its many accompanying procedural failures
and the Georgia court's "rubber-stamp" approval of every death sen-
tence it purports to examine. 4
The current pro forma nature of this review stands in stark contrast
to the way the State of Georgia assured the U.S. Supreme Court that the
process would be administered. In response to a certified question from
the U.S. Supreme Court, the Georgia state supreme court analogized its
treatment of aggravating circumstances to a pyramid: all cases of homi-
cide are contained within the pyramid, with the consequences to the per-
petrator becoming increasingly severe as the case moves from the
pyramid's base to its apex. 5 The first plane of division distinguishes
murder from all other homicides; the second plane separates all murders
from those for which the death penalty is a possibility due to the pres-
ence of one or more statutorily defined aggravating circumstances; and
the third sets apart from all death-eligible murders those for which-
pursuant to the discretionary judgment of a jury considering all evidence
in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment-death actu-
ally will be imposed.1 6 The Supreme Court of Georgia specified that its
automatic review of death sentences acted as a final limitation on the
imposition of the punishment, examining "whether the penalty of death
was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbi-
trary factor; whether the statutory aggravating circumstances are sup-
ported by the evidence; and whether the sentence of death is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.""i While
performance of this function may cause the Georgia court to remove a
case from the death penalty category, it can never have the reverse effect
of subsuming it. 8
It is critical under Georgia's laws and procedures that the state
supreme court review adequately constrains state officials and jurors
12. Id. § 17-10-35(c)(1), (3).
13. Id. § 17-10-35(e).
14. See infra Part III.E.3-4.
15. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 870 (1983).
16. Id. at 871-72 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 297 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ga. 1982)).
17. Zant, 297 S.E.2d at 3 (citing GA. CODE. ANN. § 27-2537 (Harrison 1978) (current version
at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35 (2008)).
18. Id.
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who favor the death penalty, since district attorneys are granted virtually
unbridled discretion in deciding which murder defendants will be
exposed to the possibility of capital punishment. By way of example, the
petitioner in McCleskey v. Kemp submitted a deposition from Lewis R.
Slaton, who for eighteen years had served as the district attorney of
Fulton County, where the petitioner had been tried and sentenced. ' 9 The
testimony that Slaton provided regarding his duties in office, and his
description of a lack of any standard procedures or guidelines to inform
or constrain any of the assistant district attorneys in their fulfillment of
such responsibilities during any stage of the prosecution of cases, is
indicative of a systemic susceptibility to abuse and injustice. Having
received only "on-the-job training," individual prosecutors were granted
full discretion to decide when to seek an indictment for murder over a
lesser charge, when to plea bargain or to reduce or dismiss charges, and
when to seek the death penalty.20 The assistant district attorneys
informed Slaton of these decisions "as they saw fit," and at no point
were they required to justify or explain themselves.21 Moreover, beyond
Slaton's periodic pulling of evidentiary files at random in order to check
on the status of cases, there were no supervisory efforts to maintain con-
sistency among prosecutorial decisions or to identify and rectify any
potential discriminatory abuses of discretion.22
Georgia's capital-sentencing procedures thus exhibit severe defi-
ciencies at every stage: a murder statute that fails to discriminate
between degrees of murder and that contains a number of vaguely writ-
ten statutory aggravating factors, providing a basis from which an
impermissibly large number of defendants can be considered death eligi-
ble; prosecutors who have neither the guidance nor the incentive to culti-
vate consistency in their capital-punishment and plea-bargaining
decisions, either within or between districts; and a state supreme court
review-intended to rectify abuses of discretion that may occur in the
lower courts as a result of overbroad statutory construction-that has
degenerated into a perfunctory exercise that does little if anything to
ensure that the death penalty is not disproportionately applied in any
given case. Accordingly, and as the following sections will show, the
current imposition of the death penalty under Georgia law contradicts
the expectations of the U.S. Supreme Court and the requirements that it
promulgated when it originally upheld the applicable criminal and pro-
cedural statutes. Moreover, Georgia's death-penalty practices violate a
19. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 357 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing
Transcript of Record at 1316, McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (No. 84-6811)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 357-58.
22. Id. at 358.
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number of the provisions and principles of the U.S. Constitution, partic-
ularly the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment and the guarantee of equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
This second section of the article contends that Georgia's death-
penalty statutes and procedures violate the Eighth Amendment prohibi-
tion against cruel and usual punishment as the concept has been devel-
oped over three decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence. More
particularly, this section identifies the increasingly influential judicial
recognition of consistency and restraint as dual constitutional mandates
with respect to the state-sanctioned extinguishment of a human life and
describes more fully how, as applied, Georgia's capital-punishment law
stands in contravention of both: it does not constrain application of the
death penalty to only the most extreme and atrocious crimes and
criminals, nor does it differentiate in any meaningful way between those
defendants who are executed and those who are spared.
The Eighth Amendment section of this article thus begins with an
assessment of how the Court establishes the continually evolving limita-
tions on punishment under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,
noting the importance of both community values and independent judi-
cial construction of what precedent dictates. The following two parts of
the section specifically focus on how ambiguous and potentially over-
broad statutory aggravating factors and unconstrained prosecutorial dis-
cretion have led to an appearance of arbitrariness in sentencing
decisions. This, in turn, undermines the legitimacy of the entire Georgia
criminal-justice system from the perspective of Georgia's citizens.
After considering the role of the jury as arbiter of the "community
values" that fix when, if ever, the State is justified in inflicting a death
sentence, the article explores the importance of a thorough proportional-
ity review to the constitutionality of Georgia's capital-punishment
scheme. Specifically, the article argues that the U.S. Supreme Court's
approval of Georgia's death-penalty statute in Gregg v. Georgia2 3 was
conditioned on the state's promise of a mandatory and properly per-
formed proportionality review in every applicable case. This position
aligns with the separate statement that Justice Stevens made in the recent
denial of certiorari on the issue in Walker v. Georgia,24 but conflicts
with Justice Thomas's interpretation of Court precedent as articulated in
an additional separate statement to that same case. The Justices' con-
23. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
24. 129 S. Ct. 452 (2008).
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flicting opinions seem to indicate that the Supreme Court will be pressed
to clarify its position on Georgia's laws in the near future.
Notwithstanding the evidence that both the Georgia legislature and
the U.S. Supreme Court considered a comprehensive proportionality
review to be critical to the fair application of the state's death-penalty
statutes and procedures, the article next is able to demonstrate that the
Georgia court has neglected its obligations. By selecting an increasingly
abbreviated range of cases, by utilizing improper case comparators, and
by incorporating overturned and otherwise inappropriate sentences into
its analysis, the state court's perfunctory review procedures provide only
a pretense of protecting a capital defendant's rights. The article shows
that as a result, Georgia's death-penalty law cannot be said to conform
to the requirements of the Eighth Amendment regarding the appropriate
purposes for capital punishment and the manner in which the govern-
ment may punish its citizens.
The final part of this section of the article introduces a hypothetical
death-row petitioner (an amalgamation of real capital-murder defend-
ants) in order to show how the current iteration of Georgia's proportion-
ality review omits from consideration comparable murder cases that
resulted in life sentences-whether due to a plea bargain, a prosecutorial
decision not to pursue the death penalty at all, or the mercy of the sen-
tencing authority-which in turn skews the reviewing judges' percep-
tion of whether capital punishment is commensurate with the severity of
the crime. This section of the article therefore concludes that the combi-
nation of the overbroad construction of the state's statutory aggravating
factors and the consistent failure of the state supreme court to adequately
undertake its required proportionality review has resulted in an arbitrary
and inconsistent capital punishment scheme that violates the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution and therefore must
be struck down.
A. Overview of the Eighth Amendment Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause
1. HISTORY OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment, provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted."25 The meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
of the Eighth Amendment has been developed through decades of
Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing the constitutionality of the
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
[Vol. 64:175
20091 PROPORTIONALITY AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 183
death penalty under various circumstances. "The Amendment proscribes
'all excessive punishments, as well as cruel and unusual punishments
that may or may not be excessive.' ,,26 Underlying this prohibition of
excessive punishments is the basic "precept of justice that punishment
for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense."27
Such proportionality is assessed based on currently prevailing norms
28
and the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."29
Such evolving standards of decency "must embrace and express
respect for the dignity of the person, and the punishment of criminals
must conform to that rule."3 ° This is especially crucial in the context of
capital punishment because when the State punishes by death, the law
and those who enforce it in pursuit of retributive justice risk
"descen[ding] into brutality" and "transgressing the constitutional com-
mitment to decency and restraint."'" Accordingly, the Eighth Amend-
ment demands that capital punishment "be limited to those offenders
who commit 'a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose
extreme culpability makes them 'the most deserving of execution.' 
3 2
2. CONTINUALLY EVOLVING MEANING OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Since "the cruel and unusual punishment clause [is] not a static
concept, but one that must be continually re-examined in the light of
contemporary human knowledge," and "the cruel and unusual language
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society," the fact that capital punishment has
been considered permissible throughout the history of the United States
does not necessarily mean that it remains permissible today.33 Thus, the
Georgia and United States Supreme Courts are obligated to recurrently
reassess Georgia's sentencing procedures and decisions to ensure that
they comport with continually evolving societal standards and norms of
decency. The citizens of Georgia, in particular, have displayed a consist-
ently decreasing willingness to send convicted murderers to death row:
in the years comprising the mid- to late-1990s, juries issued death
26. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 311 n.7 (2002)), modified on denial of reh'g, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008).
27. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
28. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
29. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
30. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649.
31. Id. at 2650.
32. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
33. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 328-29 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (internal
punctuation omitted) ("The fact ... that the Court, or individual Justices, may have in the past
expressed an opinion that the death penalty is constitutional is not now binding on [the Court].").
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sentences anywhere from one-half to two-thirds of the time that they had
the option; whereas in the years following 2000, the pattern reversed,
and juries rejected the death penalty two-thirds of the time.34 In the year
2006, for the first time in thirty years, no Georgia jury handed down a
death sentence.35
Even if the U.S. Supreme Court continues to reaffirm its decision in
Gregg v. Georgia, however, and to hold that Georgia's capital-punish-
ment law is (for the present time) facially constitutional, such a holding
would not be binding with respect to the adequacy of Georgia's proce-
dures as applied:
[If the Georgia Supreme Court properly performs the task assigned
to it under the Georgia statutes, death sentences imposed for discrimi-
natory reasons or wantonly or freakishly for any given category of
crime will be set aside. Petitioner has wholly failed to establish, and
has not even attempted to establish, that the Georgia Supreme Court
failed properly to perform its task in this case or that it is incapable of
performing its task adequately in all cases; and this Court should not
assume that it did not do SO.
3 6
In other words, since the petitioner in Gregg raised only a general chal-
lenge to Georgia's procedures and did not attempt to present evidence as
to more specific instances of failure in the appellate review process, the
U.S. Supreme Court in the exercise of judicial restraint refrained from
speculating on the possible inadequacies of the statute as applied or
potential derelictions of duty in any particular case. In contrast, Geor-
gia's penitentiaries currently are populated by a number of death-row
inmates who can present evidence that does indeed establish that,
regardless of the adequacy or inadequacy in the abstract of the statutory
procedures that the Supreme Court of Georgia is obligated to undertake,
in practice, and particularly as applied to such inmates' individual cases,
the procedures have failed to conform to the effective review process
that the U.S. Supreme Court envisioned in Gregg-an assumption that
comprised part of the foundation for that Court's decision that Georgia's
death-penalty statute was constitutional on its face.37
34. Heather Vogell, A Matter of Life or Death: 'I Still Saw This Man as a Human Being,'
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 25, 2007, at A5.
35. Id. The researchers also noted that the Georgia justice system sent five or more people to
death row every year between 1974 and 2000 but has sent fewer than five persons to death row
each year since then. Id.
36. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 224 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
37. Although this author has a longstanding, academic interest in the modem institution of
capital punishment, this particular article was motivated by the author's personal involvement in a
currently pending death-penalty appeal in Georgia. Until all avenues for challenging the client's
death sentence have been fully exercised, this author prefers to omit any details of the client's case
from this article, even when the information is otherwise publicly available. However, some of the
characteristics and circumstances attributed to the hypothetical defendant referred to herein reflect
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3. OBJECTIVE INDICIA AS EVIDENCE OF CRUEL OR
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In assessing whether "the death penalty is disproportionate to the
crime committed" in violation of the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme
Court considers "'objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed
in legislative enactments and state practice with respect to executions'
but also relies upon "the standards elaborated by controlling precedents
and by the Court's own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose."38 In this process of
refining and clarifying the continually evolving meaning of the Eighth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has demonstrated its willingness to
engage in statistical analysis and other methods of quantifying and
assessing data-and indeed, has often found such evidence persuasive. 9
Such statistical evidence can be informative about relevant social norms
and consensus, even if the existence of a legislative enactment alone
might seem to suggest that the death penalty is generally favored by the
governing body's constituents.
For example, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court noted that
although a number of states had passed legislation permitting the impo-
sition of the death sentence in child-rape cases, "no individual ha[d]
been executed for the rape of an adult or child since 1964. "40 In other
words, in determining whether the death penalty is a constitutionally
permissible, proportionate, and appropriate punishment for a crime, the
Court deems relevant not simply whether the legislature has passed a
law authorizing capital punishment under the particular circumstances,
but also the frequency with which judges and juries actually impose the
death sentence when the facts of a case would allow it. Notably, the
Supreme Court's emphasis is not on whether capital punishment is ever
imposed under certain conditions, but rather the relative frequency of its
imposition; using the former measurement could result in a high aggre-
gate total if the sentencing criteria are written so broadly as to encom-
pass a large number of murders, even if under the latter methodology,
those of such client and other similarly situated death-row inmates. The author reminds the reader
that the stylistic choice of using a hypothetical, rather than an actual defendant's case, should not
detract from the fact that real persons are deeply affected by the constitutional problems
articulated in this article, which should underscore the urgency of resolving these issues.
38. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 563 (2005) and citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182), modified on
denial of reh'g, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008).
39. See id. at 2651 ("The existence of objective indicia of consensus against making a crime
punishable by death was a relevant concern in Roper, Atkins, Coker, and Enmund, and we follow
the approach of those cases here.").
40. Id. at 2657.
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the relative imposition of capital punishment (that is, the actual com-
pared to the potential number of death sentences) is quite low. Critically,
and as will be further elaborated, the state supreme court proportionality
and constitutionality review mandated by Georgia's sentencing proce-
dures overlooks this distinction.
4. CONSISTENCY AND RESTRAINT IN PUNISHMENT
Two themes pervade the U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding
the underlying procedures and surrounding circumstances that are neces-
sary for the death penalty to be permissible. First is the idea of consis-
tency: persons convicted of similar crimes should be punished similarly,
and there must be a cognizable rationale as to why certain defendants
receive a death sentence and others do not.41 Second is the idea of
restraint: given that those convicted of similar wrongdoing must receive
punishment of approximately the same magnitude, and given the duty of
the courts to uphold the respect for human life and dignity mandated by
the Constitution, capital punishment must be a relative rarity, imposed
only on those guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the most abhorrent
crimes and heinous behavior. 2 The Georgia state supreme court propor-
tionality review is meant to ensure that citizens serving on juries and
other state actors in the lower court system do not overreach their
authority in contradiction to either of these two principles.
B. Sentencing Decisions: The "Extreme and Atrocious" Limitation
1. THE RELATIVE RARITY OF "EXTREME AND ATROCIOUS" MURDERS
Assuming that there are at least some circumstances under which it
is constitutional for the State to inflict the death penalty-an assumption
that several Justices have questioned,43 but which at present time a
41. See, e.g., id. at 2658 (stating that in order to promote the constitutionally required
principle of human decency, "[o]ne approach has been to insist upon general rules that ensure
consistency in determining who receives a death sentence"); see also California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 541 (1987) ("[D]eath penalty statutes [must] be structured so as to prevent the penalty
from being administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion.").
42. See, e.g., Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659 (The approach of the Court "has been to insist upon
confining the instances in which capital punishment may be imposed .... [B]ecause 'death as a
punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability,' capital punishment must be reserved for
those crimes that are 'so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be
the penalty of death.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 184
(1976) (plurality opinion))); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) ("[T]he death
penalty is reserved for a narrow category of crimes and offenders.").
43. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 64-67 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that even if proper procedural protections exist and are exercised, the death penalty itself may not
be a constitutional exercise of the State's power, since "the emotions generated by capital crimes"
may "invariably [affect] ... impermissible considerations" by the decisions of juries, trial judges,
and appellate courts); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 905 (1983) (Marshall & Brennan,
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majority of Justices hold'-the gravity and finality of the sentence is
such that it will be proportional to the severity of the crime only in the
rarest and most extreme cases. The recurrent theme in Supreme Court
jurisprudence that "death is different"45 and "unique[ ]"46 stems from the
recognition that death is "an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its
pain, in its finality, and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is
comparable to death in terms of physical and mental suffering."4 7 When
the State sanctions "[t]he calculated killing of a human being," it consti-
tutes "a denial of the executed person's humanity" and the extinguish-
ment not only of his life, but of his rights, such that even if "[t]he
punishment itself may have been unconstitutionally inflicted, ... the
finality of death precludes relief."48
Accordingly, "[t]he outstanding characteristic of our present prac-
tice of punishing criminals by death is the infrequency with which we
resort to it. The evidence is conclusive that death is not the ordinary
punishment for any crime."4 9 Death is certainly not the ordinary punish-
ment for several specific subtypes of murder for which a disturbingly
high number of Georgia inmates have been placed on death row. With-
out undermining the serious nature of the offenses with which these
individuals are charged, and notwithstanding the actions of certain over-
zealous prosecutors and judges, juries both within Georgia and through-
out the United States typically do not prescribe capital sentences under
similar factual circumstances. Thus, for example, for all persons in
Georgia convicted of a murder in the course of the armed robbery of a
business or a home invasion between 1995 and 2004, less than five per-
cent were sentenced to die.5° Even for those categories of crimes with
relatively higher rates of death-penalty convictions, such as multiple
JJ., dissenting) ("IT]he death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the [Constitution]." (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting) and
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 370-71 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring))).
44. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1529 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy &
Alito, JJ.) (plurality opinion) ("We begin with the principle, settled by Gregg, that capital
punishment is constitutional.").
45. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (plurality opinion) (citing
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)
(plurality opinion)).
46. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 290 (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 291.
50. Bill Rankin et al., A Matter of Life and Death: Death Still Arbitrary, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Sept. 23, 2007, at Al. From 1995 to 2004, murders associated with the armed robbery of a
business resulted in 8 death sentences and 168 life sentences, or a death-sentence rate of
approximately 4.5%. In the same time period, Georgia imposed 223 life sentences and only 13
death sentences on convicted murderers whose crime occurred during a home invasion-a mere
3.6% of relevant and eligible cases.
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murders, less than ten percent of all defendants received a death sen-
tence. 51 Among these defendants, there does not appear to be, in the
words of Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman, any "rational basis
that could differentiate ... the few who die from the many who go to
prison.'"52
2. THE PROBLEM OF OVERBROAD STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS
Justice Brennan, in his Furman concurrence, also dispensed with
the State's argument that the sporadic imposition of the death penalty
was evidence of "informed selectivity" rather than arbitrariness:
Informed selectivity, of course, is a value not to be denigrated....
[But] [w]hen the rate of infliction is at this low level, it is highly
implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals who com-
mit the worst crimes are selected for this punishment.... [A]ll cases
to which the laws apply are necessarily "extreme." Nor is the distinc-
tion credible in fact. If, for example, petitioner Furman or his crime
illustrates the "extreme," then nearly all murderers and their murders
are also "extreme."-
53
The version of the Georgia death-penalty statute with which the Furman
Court was concerned gave juries more unguided discretion in deciding
who would receive the death penalty than the current statute, at least on
its face. The de facto effect of Georgia's current law and procedures,
however, is to bestow a similar amount of discretion on prosecutors and
sentencing authorities, thus subjecting defendants to the same risk of
capricious punishment that necessitated the demise of the former statute.
Specifically, as they are applied, the statutory aggravating factors
do not "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death pen-
alty" and fail to "reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sen-
tence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder."5 4
This is evidenced by the fact that over half of the murders in Georgia
display one or more statutory aggravating factors and are thus death eli-
gible,55 and the fact that among these death-eligible defendants, there is
no meaningful and constitutionally valid distinction between the charac-
ter or crimes of the few who are executed and the rest who are spared,
beyond the whims of the district attorney or the sentencing judge or jury
51. Id. Of the 172 multiple-murder cases examined from 1995 to 2004, 155 convicted
defendants received terms of imprisonment, while only 17 received the death penalty.
52. Furman, 408 U.S. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Rankin et al., supra
note 50 (describing, by way of case histories for five categories of aggravated murder, how
defendants who committed factually similar crimes receive drastically different punishments).
53. Furman, 408 U.S. at 293-94 (Brennan, J., concurring).
54. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
55. Rankin et al., supra note 50 (finding that "56 percent of all murders in the decade studied
were still eligible for death, including hundreds of moderately aggravated cases").
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for the particular case. Given the Eighth Amendment mandate that death
sentences should be imposed rarely and only for the most extreme
crimes, subjecting these defendants to capital punishment in many cases
will be an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment in violation of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Treating it otherwise, moreo-
ver, would compel the imposition of the death penalty in countless addi-
tional cases, to an extent that itself would violate constitutional law by
rendering the restriction to "extreme" cases meaningless.
C. Sentencing Decisions: Arbitrariness and Prosecutorial Discretion
1. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ARBITRARINESS UNDER IMPRECISE OR
EXPANSIVE STATUTORY CRITERIA
The problem of overbroad statutory aggravating factors discussed
in the immediately preceding part of this article exacerbates the addi-
tional problem of the appearance of arbitrariness within the penal sys-
tem. Broadly written and nonuniformly applied statutory aggravating
factors increase the total number of defendants eligible for death under
Georgia law to an extent that renders the state's sentencing procedures
constitutionally suspect. In the past, the U.S. Supreme Court has been
wary of statutes that significantly expand the pool of defendants subject
to capital punishment at the discretion of the presiding district attorney
and will look beyond the language of the statute to examine how it is
applied in practice: "Legislative 'policy' is thus necessarily defined not
by what is legislatively authorized but by what juries and judges do in
exercising the discretion so regularly conferred upon them."56
In Kennedy v. Louisiana, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated a Louisiana statute authorizing the imposition of the death
penalty for the crime of rape of a child, in part because of the excessive
number of executions that would be permitted under the law.57 Of equal
significance, therefore, should be the similarly and unduly large number
of persons who would be eligible for execution if all district attorneys
and judges across Georgia engaged in the broadest construction of the
current death-penalty statute that the face of the text seems to allow. If
every jurisdiction in the state were to pursue capital punishment as
aggressively and against as extensive a spectrum of defendants as offi-
cials in certain Georgia counties have done,58 the number of potential
56. Furman, 408 U.S. at 314 (White, J., concurring).
57. 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008).
58. The discrepancy in the rate and aggressiveness with which different Georgia counties
pursue the death penalty is most apparent between urban and suburban districts. In the
metropolitan Atlanta area, for example, a capital sentence is significantly more probable in the
suburban Cobb and Douglas counties than it is in the urban DeKalb and Fulton counties. See
Georgia Moratorium Campaign, Problems with Georgia's Death Penalty, http://www.
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executions would rise to a level that the Supreme Court implies should
be constitutionally impermissible.59
The Supreme Court has already made it clear that, because of the
"uniqueness" of the death penalty, it cannot "be imposed under sentenc-
ing procedures that create[ ] a substantial risk that it [will] be inflicted in
an arbitrary and capricious manner."' 6° The criticisms levied by the Jus-
tice White on Georgia's death-penalty statute when the Court struck it
down as unconstitutional in Furman are equally applicable to the state's
current statute: "[T]he death penalty is exacted with great infrequency
even for the most atrocious crimes and. . there is no meaningful basis
for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not."'61 When less than one in ten persons, or even
one in twenty persons, convicted of a particular subcategory of murder
under one of Georgia's statutory aggravating factors is sentenced to
death,62 the punishment can fairly be said to be
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is
cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of... murders...many just as reprehensible as [the defendant's], [the defendant is]
among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sen-
tence of death has in fact been imposed .... [T]he Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of
death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed.63
Just as the lack of "suitably directed and limited" discretion inhering in
the Georgia statute at issue in Furman led to a finding of its unconstitu-
tionality,64 so too does the arbitrary and disproportionate nature of pre-
sent-day capital convictions in Georgia necessitate that both the
sentences of these defendants and the Georgia death-penalty laws and
procedures that support them be overturned.
georgiamoratorium.org/application.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2008). Additional county-to-county
comparisons reveal shocking disparities, such as the greater number of death-row inmates found
in Baldwin County, which averages only two murders per year, relative to Fulton County, which
averages 230 murders per year. Id. (citing Richard Willing & Gary Fields, Geography of the
Death Penalty, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 1999, at Al).
59. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660 ("[O]nly 2.2% of convicted first-degree murderers are
sentenced to death." Allowing death penalty states to "sentence to death all persons convicted of
raping a child . .. could not be reconciled with our evolving standards of decency and the
necessity to constrain the use of the death penalty.").
60. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion).
61. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
62. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (providing data demonstrating the sporadic
imposition of death sentences on various categories of aggravated murder).
63. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
64. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion).
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2. LIMITATIONS TO THE TOLERANCE OF DISCRETIONARY
ACTION UNDER GREGG
There are "opportunities for discretionary action that are inherent in
the processing of any murder case under Georgia law."65 For instance,
"the state prosecutor has unfettered authority to select those persons
whom he wishes to prosecute for a capital offense and to plea bargain
with them."6 6 In the past, the Supreme Court has not been persuaded by
the contention that this or other discretionary opportunities are them-
selves sufficient to render the Georgia death-penalty statute unconstitu-
tionally vague. As the Gregg Court construed it, a prosecutor's decision
of whether or not to seek capital punishment was in the context of
"remov[ing] a defendant from consideration as a candidate for the death
penalty," and the Court noted that a "decision to afford an individual
defendant mercy" was not unconstitutional.67
This rationale, however, presumes that the defendant justifiably
should have been among those considered eligible for a death sentence
in the first place. Yet if the judicial and prosecutorial construction given
to the statutory aggravating factors is broader than the legislature
intended or than the Constitution permits, any concern that some capital
defendants are arbitrarily shown mercy is subordinate to the problem
that others, who never should have been death eligible to begin with,
will not receive such mercy. The Court has acknowledged as much when
it stated that "[s]ince the proportionality requirement on review is
intended to prevent caprice in the decision to inflict the penalty," a jury
decision to spare a particular defendant from death is not unconstitu-
tional, provided that the defendants are "sentenced under a system that
does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice. 6 8 Under a
statute where the majority of all murders meet one or more of the statu-
tory aggravating factors, 69 and where prosecutors have unbridled discre-
tion to pursue a death sentence in any, all, or none of these cases, such
impermissible arbitrariness is not just a "risk" but an inevitability.
The Gregg Court's disposition of the petitioner's argument that
Georgia's "statutory aggravating circumstances are vague and therefore
susceptible of widely differing interpretations, thus creating a substantial
risk that the death penalty will be arbitrarily inflicted by Georgia
juries,"7 was cursory and necessarily incomplete, since the petitioner
65. Id. at 199.
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 203.
69. See Rankin et al., supra note 50.
70. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 202.
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only brought two of the possible ten statutory aggravating factors into
issue. As noted above, a number of the statutory criteria are susceptible
to expansive interpretation, but the Gregg Court was not given reason to
expressly consider them. Moreover, the Court's holding against the peti-
tioner was made "[i]n light of the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Georgia" at that time,71 before the Court had sufficient opportunity to
discern how the criteria would be applied.
The Gregg Court also acknowledged that the mere existence of sen-
tencing guidelines may not be sufficient to withstand constitutional scru-
tiny: "A system could have standards so vague that they would fail
adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the
result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found
unconstitutional in Furman could occur."' 72 Although applicable state-
court precedent at the time that the Gregg opinion was issued may have
suggested that the statute would be narrowly construed, more than three
decades of Supreme Court of Georgia and lower-court jurisprudence
subsequent to the decision indicate otherwise. As a result, Georgia's
death-penalty practices, as they now stand, fail to comply with the U.S.
Supreme Court's condition that sentencing procedures be structured in a
way so as to avoid arbitrary or disproportionate results.
3. THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE: APPEARANCE OF ARBITRARINESS
The Eighth Amendment judgment about whether a punishment is
disproportionate to the severity of the crime "should not be, or appear to
be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should
be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent. '73 The
gross discrepancy between the rate of capital punishment-even in fac-
tually similar cases-throughout the various districts of Georgia, how-
ever, is evidence that neither district attorneys nor judges (including the
state supreme court judges in their proportionality review) are making
these sentencing decisions based on objective criteria to an extent suffi-
cient to comport with the demands of the Constitution. Even if purport-
edly guided by statutory criteria, in practice the decisions about who will
suffer a death sentence appear wholly arbitrary in a way that undermines
the integrity of the judicial system and is manifestly unconstitutional.
The damage that the systemic flaws inhering in Georgia's death-
penalty procedures inflict on the legitimacy of the state's criminal-jus-
tice system should not be discounted. "It is of vital importance to the
defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death
71. Id.
72. Id. at 195 n.46.
73. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion."74 The widespread and pointed criticisms of the inequities and
injustices under the current law show that Georgia's capital-sentencing
structure fails in both respects: the public does not perceive the system
to be fair, and both qualitative and quantitative data support the accuracy
of this perception of unfairness. For instance, of the 1,315 murder cases
that were death-penalty eligible in the ten-year period from 1995
through 2004, prosecutors pursued capital punishment for only one out
of four defendants, with only one in twenty-three of these defendants
(about 4.3%) ending up on death row.75 Moreover, even out of the most
severe ten percent of death-eligible cases (as identified through a statisti-
cal analysis incorporating factors such as multiple victims, a rape, or
torture), only twenty-two percent of the convicted killers were placed on
death row.76
The sentencing discrepancies between defendants found guilty of
killing white victims and those found guilty of killing black victims are
particularly detrimental to the legitimacy of the criminal-justice system.
"Race discrimination is 'especially pernicious in the administration of
justice.' And public respect for our system of justice is undermined
when the system discriminates based on race."77 Even after controlling
for differences between cases (such as evidence of rape or torture, or a
confession) that could contribute to a district attorney's motivation to
pursue capital punishment, killers of white victims remained twice as
likely as killers of black victims to be placed on death row.78 Notwith-
standing the absence of any explicit directive to take divergent
approaches to cases depending on the race of the victim, the de facto
racial classifications and discriminatory treatment that a standardless
system permits severely damages the integrity of the law in the eyes of
the public and "undermine[s] [the Court's] 'unceasing efforts to eradi-
cate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system."' 79
74. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
75. Rankin et al., supra note 50.
76. See id. The study found that although prosecutors sought the death penalty in 103 of the
132 cases statistically determined to be the "worst" 10% of 1,315 total death-eligible murders,
nearly half of the 103 defendants were allowed to plead guilty to avoid the possibility of death,
and others were sentenced by judge or jury to life imprisonment, so that ultimately only 29 of the
132 most severe cases resulted in the defendant on death row. Id.
77. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 (2005) (citation omitted) (quoting Rose v.
Mitchell, 433 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
78. Heather Vogell, A Matter of Life or Death: Pattern of Racial Disparity, ATLAA J.-
CONST., Sept. 23, 2007, at A17, available at 2007 WLNR 18647394.
79. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 512 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987)).
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D. Sentencing Decisions: The Jury as Arbiter of
"Community Values"
The Gregg Court stressed that Georgia's sentencing procedures
"require as a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty, specific
jury findings as to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the
defendant."8 The criminal-sentencing statute at issue was upheld in part
because the Supreme Court envisioned a system whereby death would
be imposed only if the members of the jury collectively agreed beyond a
reasonable doubt that one or more statutory aggravating factors were
present; and even if such aggravating circumstances were found, the jury
would be permitted to make a binding recommendation of mercy irre-
spective of the existence or nonexistence of any mitigating factors.8"
Such a sentencing scheme, presented in the abstract, appears to help
minimize the risk that the fact finder will hand down an arbitrary or
disproportionate sentence. In practice, however, a solitary judge, rather
than a fair cross-section of the community as embodied in a jury, may
make these critical findings. Moreover, the disparate outcomes in similar
cases demonstrate that the purportedly "clear and objective" standards
that "control" the fact finder's exercise of discretion have been insuffi-
cient, in application, to protect against arbitrary and disproportionate
results. Furthermore, the flexibility of the system, which was intended to
facilitate the sentencing authority's ability to show mercy to convicted
defendants, in practice only further randomizes who is selected for
death, especially given the large pool of defendants who ultimately are
death eligible under Georgia's broadly written statutory provisions.
Death sentences where the decision is made by a judge rather than a
jury are especially problematic, since the absence of a collective and
reasoned judgment from a pool of the defendant's fellow citizens elimi-
nates the "link between contemporary community values and the penal
system."8 The Supreme Court has attributed the "reluctance of juries in
many cases to impose the [death] sentence" to "the humane feeling that
this most irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number
of extreme cases."83 Research and analysis of the death penalty in Geor-
gia has demonstrated that juries making sentencing decisions in accor-
dance with "contemporary community values" rarely find capital
punishment warranted for death-eligible murders in general, with the
frequency plummeting to a near nullity for certain subtypes of crimes.84
80. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion).
81. See id. at 196-97.
82. Id. at 181 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
83. Id. at 182.
84. See source cited supra note 50 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 64:175
2009] PROPORTIONALITY AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 195
These same "community values" are supposed to help inform the
Supreme Court of Georgia's determination of whether capital punish-
ment in a given case comports with the demands of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Accordingly, the use of a judge rather than a jury sentencer
hinders appellate analysis of whether capital punishment in the defen-
dant's particular circumstances is violative of the Eighth Amendment.
Whenever the decision is taken out of the hands of a jury-which
embodies a cross-section of such community values 85-and placed into
the hands of a single judge, the defendants in such cases are deprived of
an additional safeguard against unconstitutional imposition of the death
penalty. "When a defendant's life is at stake, the Court has been particu-
larly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed. 86
E. The Importance of Proportionality Review to
Georgia's Procedures
1. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO
APPROVAL UNDER GREGG IN GEORGIA
The contention that the promise of a thorough state supreme court
review was integral to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to uphold the
Georgia death-penalty statute in Gregg v. Georgia is evidenced by the
opinion itself87 as well as by subsequent cases interpreting the language
contained therein. In Gregg, the U.S. Supreme Court found that Geor-
gia's death-penalty procedures adequately controlled the discretion of
the sentencing authority88 and ensured that capital punishment would
not be imposed so arbitrarily as to be invalid under the authority of
Furman v. Georgia.89 Both the opinion of the Court and Justice White's
concurrence in Gregg "made much of the statutorily required compara-
tive proportionality review." 90 Later cases confirmed that the Gregg
Court's approval of the Georgia sentencing procedures was dependent
on "meaningful appellate review of every death sentence," 9' wherein the
state supreme court would "review[ ] the record of every death penalty
proceeding to determine whether the sentence was arbitrary or dispro-
portionate." 9 Initially, the Supreme Court of Georgia abided by this
directive in a meaningful way, conducting an extensive review of all
85. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
86. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71
(1932) and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in result)).
87. See id. at 198.
88. Id. at 197-98.
89. Id. at 222 (White, J., concurring).
90. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198, 204-06, 222-23).
91. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983).
92. Id. at 876.
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death sentences that included comparisons to similar cases where a term
of life imprisonment, rather than capital punishment, was imposed.93 As
a result, in the relatively short interval between the enactment of the
post-Funnan revised statute through the year 1981, the Georgia court
reversed ten death sentences on proportionality grounds.94 Since then,
and following the Georgia court's practice to drop life sentences from its
analyses, however, no death sentences have been overturned on propor-
tionality grounds. 95
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Pulley v. Harris96 generated
some ambiguity as to whether and when an appellate proportionality
review will be a constitutionally required element of capital sentencing
procedures. The Pulley Court held that although mandatory proportion-
ality review was a component of the judicially approved laws and prac-
tices of certain other states, this fact in itself did not render such a
review "indispensable" to every statute, including the California statute
specifically before the Court. 97 The dicta of certain Justices in later opin-
ions reflects an apparent adherence to an overly expansive interpretation
of the Pulley decision, construing it as completely eliminating the need
for a proportionality review under the procedures of any jurisdiction. 98
The language of Pulley itself, however, expressly states that the
Supreme Court must "take statutes as we find them." 99 Moreover,
majority opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court subsequent to Pul-
ley recognize that compulsory appellate review is an integral part of
Georgia's sentencing procedures, regardless of its constitutional neces-
sity in other states. In the McCleskey decision, handed down three years
after Pulley, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that Geor-
gia's mandatory review is "administered pursuant to [the] Court's deci-
sions interpreting the limits of the Eighth Amendment on the imposition
of the death penalty," meant to "ensure a degree of care in the imposi-
tion of the sentence of death that can be described only as unique." 100
Georgia's statutory sentencing scheme is distinct from those
employed by other states in a number of significant ways that render
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, holding other states' proportionality
reviews noncompulsory under the Constitution, inapplicable to the
93. Bill Rankin, A Matter of Life or Death: Is Review Process Too Narrow?, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Sept. 26, 2007, at A5.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
97. Id. at 44-45.
98. See, e.g., Walker v. Georgia, 129 S. Ct. 481, 482-83 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring).
99. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 45.
100. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 n.37 (1987).
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Georgia procedures. Specifically, "[i]n Georgia, unlike some other
States, the jury is not instructed to give any special weight to any aggra-
vating circumstance, to consider multiple aggravating circumstances any
more significant than a single such circumstance, or to balance aggravat-
ing against mitigating circumstances pursuant to any special stan-
dard." 101 These differences leave juries in Georgia less guided by
legislative mandate in their decisions and thus more vulnerable to hand-
ing down inconsistent sentences to similarly situated defendants. This, in
turn, renders the state supreme court review all the more important to
ensuring fair, consistent, and proportional outcomes and explains why
such a review would be constitutionally mandated in Georgia, even if it
were not in other states. "[E]ach distinct system must be examined on an
individual basis," 10 2 and language in one case minimizing the impor-
tance of a proportionality review for another state's particular scheme
does not necessarily translate to Georgia's procedures.1 °3
2. CLARIFICATION AND CONFLICT FOLLOWING JUSTICE
STEVENS'S STATEMENT IN WALKER
Most recently, in late October 2008, Justice Stevens addressed the
importance of a thorough proportionality review under the standards
articulated in Gregg by providing a separate statement to the Supreme
Court's denial of a petition for writ of certiorari in Walker v. Georgia.0 4
The petitioner in the Walker case charged the Supreme Court of Georgia
with failure to conduct a meaningful proportionality review in violation
of the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against arbitrary or discriminatory
sentencing." 5 Justice Stevens wrote separately to emphasize that the
denial of certiorari was due to a procedural technicality rather than the
merits of the claim, that such denial would have no precedential effect,
and that in fact the Court's prior opinions support the petitioner's sub-
mission. 106 Justice Stevens's opinion, particularly when contrasted with
Justice Thomas's statement, suggests that the Supreme Court is poised
101. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 873-74 (1983) (footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 875 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (plurality opinion))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Cf Walker v. Georgia, 129 S. Ct. 453, 456 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that
the assertion in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), that a comparative proportionality review
will not be required for every capital sentence "was intended to convey [the Court's] recognition
of differences among the States' capital schemes and the fact that we consider statutes as we find
them," and was not meant to undermine Court precedent concluding that "such review is an
important component of the Georgia scheme").
104. Id. at 453.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 454.
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to definitively resolve lingering concerns about the constitutionality of
Georgia's death-penalty laws and procedures.
In his appended statement, Justice Stevens asserted that the deci-
sion in Gregg to uphold Georgia's death-penalty statute "was founded
on an understanding that the new procedures the statute prescribed
would protect against the imposition of death sentences influenced by
impermissible factors" and that these procedures would include consid-
eration of similarly situated defendants "who had not been put to death
because that inquiry is an essential part of any meaningful proportional-
ity review."' 0 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Georgia itself confirmed
this assumption in response to a certified question from the U.S.
Supreme Court, expressly stating that its proportionality review "uses
for comparison purposes not only similar cases in which death was
imposed, but similar cases in which death was not imposed."
10 8
In Walker, Justice Stevens persuasively argued that the Court's
decision in Pulley v. Harris0 9 was not meant to abolish the Eighth
Amendment requirement of a proportionality review in all jurisdictions,
but rather was a recognition that it will not be constitutionally necessary
"where the statutory procedures adequately channel the sentencer's dis-
cretion"1 ' under that particular state's capital-sentencing scheme.'11
The language of the majority opinion in Pulley itself indicates that the
Court must "take statutes as we find them," without generalizing about
the indispensability of a proportionality review from one sentencing
scheme to the next,"' and holds only that "[a]ssuming that there could
be a capital sentencing system so lacking in other checks on arbitrariness
that it would not pass constitutional muster without comparative propor-
tionality review, the 1977 California statute is not of that sort.""' 3
Importantly, the Pulley decision "was not meant to undermine [the
Court's] conclusion in Gregg and Zant that such review is an important
component of the Georgia scheme."1 1 4 Nevertheless, the Georgia court
presently considers a much narrower range of cases than it did when the
state's death-penalty statute and procedures were originally approved,
now omitting from consideration those cases in which the jury sentenced
the defendant to life imprisonment-a direct contradiction to the repre-
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 880 n.19 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
109. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
110. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987).
111. See Walker, 129 S. Ct. at 456 (Stevens, J., concurring).
112. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44-45.
113. Id. at 51.
114. Walker, 129 S. Ct. at 456 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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sentations it made to the U.S. Supreme Court in Zant.' 5 "[T]he likely
result of such a truncated review-particularly in conjunction with the
remainder of the Georgia scheme, which does not cabin the jury's dis-
cretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors-is the arbitrary
or discriminatory imposition of death sentences in contravention of the
Eighth Amendment." ' 6
3. SYSTEMIC FAILURE OF THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT'S
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
The capital-sentencing system upheld by Gregg was one in which
the appellate proportionality review would "assure" that no defendant
who is "sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury" will ulti-
mately suffer death if such a penalty is generally not imposed in that
particular kind of murder case.' 17 The confidence of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Georgia's ability to employ adequate review procedures was
bolstered by its assessment of language contained in prior Georgia state
decisions: the Georgia court had required that "if the death penalty is
only rarely imposed for an act or it is substantially out of line with
sentences imposed for other acts it will be set aside as excessive." ' 8 Yet
in the years following Gregg, and as will be demonstrated more particu-
larly below, the Georgia supreme court review has upheld capital-
punishment sentences even where the predominant trend throughout the
state is to punish similar acts by similar defendants with the lesser pen-
alty of imprisonment.
Justice Stevens's scathing criticism of Georgia's required review
procedures, as discussed in the preceding section, also enumerated the
many deficiencies in the implementation of the law. First, the Georgia
court's written review, challenged by the petitioner in Walker, was short
and cursory, consisting of "a single paragraph, only the final sentence of
which" addressed the proportionality question, doing so "in the most
conclusory terms."'1 9 Second, an appendix referenced in the review as
offering support for the Georgia court's conclusions contained only a
string citation of other cases in which a jury imposed death; it mentioned
neither the facts of these cases nor the aggravating circumstances found
by the jury, which would at least help to clarify why the Georgia court
found them valid bases for comparison. 20 Third, the perfunctory review
115. Id. at 457.
116. Id.
117. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion).
118. Id. at 205 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 616 (Ga. 1974)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
119. Walker, 129 S. Ct. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
120. Id.
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that the court did undertake "was erroneous because it failed to use rea-
sonable comparators," such as relying on double-homicide cases thirty
percent of the time even though the defendant at issue had been con-
victed of only a single homicide."t ' Finally, by restricting its review to
"the limited universe of cases in which the defendant was sentenced to
death," the Georgia court neglected the importance of the "numerous
cases involving offenses very similar to petitioner's in which the jury
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment."' 22 These defects, moreover,
are not unique to the particular case under scrutiny in Walker, but rather
are a systemic problem that occurs with regularity.
23
The persistent discrepancies in sentencing outcomes are in part the
result of the limited types of cases that the Supreme Court of Georgia
has been willing to consider in its review. The petitioner in Gregg had
criticized Georgia's capital-sentencing procedures for the failure of the
Georgia supreme court to include "nonappealed capital convictions
where a life sentence is imposed and cases involving homicides where a
capital conviction is not obtained" in the group of cases it considers and
compares when assessing the appropriateness and consistency of the
death penalty for a particular defendant.124 Since the Supreme Court of
Georgia has the "authority" to consider such cases, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court found that the petitioner's criticism did not establish that
the procedures were inadequate. 25 This authority is meaningless, how-
ever, if the Supreme Court of Georgia never employs it; and the conse-
quences to the fairness and validity of the capital-punishment system as
a result of Georgia's dereliction of its responsibilities have become
increasingly apparent.
Finally, the conclusions of the McCleskey Court with respect to the
proportionality review are plagued by circular reasoning. The McCles-
key opinion claimed that "absent a showing that the Georgia capital pun-
ishment system operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner, [the
defendant] cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that
other defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death
penalty."'' 26 But realistically, the only way to show that the system is
arbitrary and capricious is to show that only certain similarly situated
121. Id. at 456 n.3. Notably, although imposition of the death penalty is sporadic even when
the defendant is found guilty of multiple homicides, the rate of capital punishment is relatively
high as compared to the rate for other aggravating factors (although still quite low when
considered independently), making the state supreme court's use of these cases as comparators all
the more misleading. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 456.
123. See id.
124. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 n.56 (1976) (plurality opinion).
125. Id.
126. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306-07 (1987).
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defendants received the death penalty, while the rest did not. A compari-
son that examines only death-sentenced defendants will likely never
show a constitutional violation as long as at some point, there was at
least one case of a somewhat similarly situated defendant receiving the
death penalty. The lack of any indication of the relative frequency with
which the penalty is imposed makes virtually impossible any kind of
coherent analysis of potential arbitrariness or caprice, whether in a par-
ticular case or in the system as a whole. Moreover, at least some of the
Justices who originally approved the capital-sentencing statute presumed
that such comprehensive assessments would take place: "That approach
seemed judicious because, quite obviously, a significant number of simi-
lar cases in which death was not imposed might well provide the most
relevant evidence of arbitrariness in the sentence before the court." '127
4. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF A PERFUNCTORY REVIEW PROCESS
When the Court in Gregg upheld Georgia's capital-sentencing pro-
cedures, it emphasized that the Georgia Supreme Court was expected to
"compare[ ] each death sentence with the sentences imposed on simi-
larly situated defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particu-
lar case is not disproportionate."' 1 8 It was on the assumption that this
appellate review would be effective to ensure a "meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not" 129 that the Gregg Court was able
conclude that Georgia's procedures conformed to the mandates of the
Constitution. In practice, however, the Supreme Court of Georgia's
review is perfunctory, failing to fulfill the duty to adequately assess,
inter alia, "whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to those
sentences imposed in similar cases."13 This failure is shown through
qualitative as well as quantitative and statistical data that evidence sys-
tematic discrepancies in the way the death penalty in Georgia is appor-
tioned and enforced, which the appellate-review process is not properly
rectifying. 131
It is self-evident that a fair proportionality review must be based on
appropriate comparators. Researchers have demonstrated, however, that
the use of overturned and inappropriate cases to justify state supreme
127. Walker, 129 S. Ct. at 454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
128. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (plurality opinion).
129. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id.
131. See Walker, 129 S. Ct. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring) (rebuking the Georgia court for
carrying out "an utterly perfunctory review," which was "stated... in the most conclusory terms"
and which included only a string citation of cases that made no reference to the underlying facts or
aggravating circumstances connected with each).
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court decisions to uphold capital sentences is not just an occasional
error, but rather occurs with disturbing regularity. Both the number of
appellate reviews affected and the extent to which these reviews contain
inaccurate and outdated information evince a system that has deterio-
rated from its original protective function into a perfunctorily executed
farce. An extensive study undertaken by the Atlanta Journal-Constitu-
tion in cooperation with University of Maryland criminologist Ray
Paternoster, for instance, examined state supreme court death-penalty
reviews dating back to 1982 and found that, of all the cases cited to
justify the imposition of a death sentence, nineteen percent already had
been overturned on appeal at the time of the citation, and an additional
seventeen percent were later reversed after the review had been com-
pleted.132 The study also revealed that eighty percent of the rulings con-
tained at least one overturned case, while another ten percent contained
citations that were reversed afterward, so that less than ten percent of all
cases in the preceding twenty-five years of state supreme court reviews
ultimately cited no overturned cases.' 33 In more than one-third of the
review decisions, twenty-five percent or more of the citations were no
longer good law.
134
Despite the pervasiveness of this problem, the Supreme Court of
Georgia will not reconsider the conclusions of its proportionality review,
even if some of the death sentences used to uphold capital punishment in
a given defendant's case have been or are later overturned.' 35 As long as
the Supreme Court of Georgia remains convinced that "the sentences in
the cases used for comparison were already at the time, or later are,
reversed for reasons unrelated to the juries' reactions to the evidence,"
reevaluation of its proportionality review is unnecessary.136 Yet the evi
dence demonstrates that the Georgia court has failed to abide by even
this lenient restriction. In its investigation into the practices of the judi-
cial system in death-penalty cases, for example, the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution revealed that nearly fifty cases cited by the state supreme
court in its proportionality reviews had been overturned for serious rea-
sons that likely would have affected jury deliberations and sentencing
decisions: inadequate representation by defense counsel, prosecutorial
misconduct, demonstrable failure of the district attorney to prove any
132. Bill Rankin et al., A Matter of Life or Death: An AJC Special Report: High Court Botched
Death Reviews, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., Sept. 26, 2007, at Al. The Supreme Court of Georgia itself
had overturned or had noted another court's decision to overturn twenty-three cases that it later
used to support upholding the death penalty. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. See Davis v. Turpin, 539 S.E.2d 129, 131 (2000).
136. Id.
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aggravating circumstances, evidentiary issues, confusing or inadequate
jury instructions by the judge, and racially skewed jury pools were
among such problems noted by the study.137
F. Proportionality: Purposes of Punishment
A capital sentence is unconstitutionally excessive if (1) it is grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime, or (2) it "makes no measur-
able contribution to [the] acceptable goals of punishment"-namely, ret-
ribution and deterrence of capital crimes. 38 Capital punishment may be
deemed unconstitutional on either ground. 139 In many capital cases, the
death penalty will fail both tests. Frequently, the lack of proportionality
between the severity of a defendant's crime or his dangerousness as a
criminal and the sentence that he receives can be established both by his
trial record and character evidence weighed independently, and by a
properly performed assessment of this data relative to the full range of
comparable cases; and this excessiveness is only underscored by the fail-
ure of such a defendant's execution to contribute to any constitutionally
valid social or criminological purpose.
With respect to specific deterrence-that is, the need to inflict
death to stop the convicted individual from committing further harms-
the circumstances of the crimes for which a substantial number of capi-
tal defendants are accused and sentenced hardly suggest the type of
hardened, calculating, repeat killers whose continuing existence argua-
bly could pose a permanent threat to society. Rather, the evidence often
bespeaks a tragic but isolated incident, inflamed by drug use, despera-
tion, or escalating conflict with the eventual victim. While these addi-
tional factors in no way excuse such a defendant's actions, they do
indicate that the defendant's impulse and motivation to kill typically
could be constrained without the State resorting to the death penalty.
Moreover, to the extent that such a person is susceptible to commit-
ting further crimes, this persisting danger can be controlled by "effective
administration of the State's pardon and parole laws," in conjunction
with, if necessary, "techniques of isolation .. .while he remains con-
fined."' 4 ° A defendant may be condemned to die without an unequivocal
showing that he is the rare type of criminal who poses such an extreme,
incorrigible, and imminent threat to society that ending his life is the
only way to prevent the perpetration of future crimes. Under this scena-
137. Rankin et al., supra note 132.
138. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); accord Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2661 (2008) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183, 187
(1976) (plurality opinion)).
139. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality opinion).
140. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300-01 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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rio, the history of cases tried throughout the State of Georgia will show
that "for so many in like circumstances[,] life imprisonment or shorter
prison terms are judged sufficient," and so it cannot "be said with confi-
dence that society's need for specific deterrence justifies death for so
few" within a group of similarly situated defendants.'41
Similarly, the argument in favor of using capital punishment to pro-
mote general deterrence has been criticized for the limited and unrealis-
tic circumstances in which it would be applicable, even hypothetically.
Specifically, the theory of general deterrence is relevant only to "a par-
ticular type of potential criminal, the rational person who will commit a
capital crime knowing that the punishment is long-term imprisonment,
which may well be for the rest of his life, but will not commit the crime
knowing that the punishment is death."' 42 Given the infrequency and
arbitrariness with which the death penalty is enforced in Georgia, more-
over, this fictional rational criminal also would have to factor in the
probability that he will be caught, convicted, and then sentenced by one
of the increasingly few juries or judges willing to impose such a punish-
ment. "[C]ommon sense and experience tell us that seldom-enforced
laws become ineffective measures for controlling human conduct and
that the death penalty, unless imposed with sufficient frequency, will
make little contribution to deterring those crimes for which it may be
exacted." '
43
Thus, while this hypothetical potential criminal might have an
awareness that the probability of a capital sentence would be signifi-
cantly increased if he were to be tried in, for example, Douglas or Cobb
County, as opposed to in another Georgia county where pursuit of the
death penalty is more restrained, 44 it is manifestly unreasonable to
expect that any potential criminal would go through this type of cost/
benefit mathematical analysis. The solution is not to impose the death
penalty on a more frequent basis, since the Constitution mandates that
capital punishment is an option reserved, if at all, for only the most
extreme and heinous criminals and crimes. Rather, in order to comply
with the dual constitutional requirements that death be imposed under
rare but consistent circumstances, the authority of a district attorney to
pursue a death sentence and the discretion of a judge or jury to impose it
must be guided and restrained in a way that has been absent from an
unacceptably large number of Georgia jurisdictions.
Accordingly, even in areas where the possibility of punishment by
141. Id. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
144. See supra note 58.
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death can reasonably be called a "credible threat" due to its overbroad
application by prosecutors, the significant degree of randomness that
persists with respect to who is subjected to the punishment and who is
granted the opportunity to enter a plea bargain (among other
prosecutorial decisions) renders any resulting deterrent effect unconsti-
tutional. In a system where all these hypothetical calculations, under-
taken by the theoretical potential criminal, are confounded by a "remote
and improbable" risk of death, and where even if death were "invariably
and swiftly imposed," the deterrent value of capital punishment would
remain merely speculative, arguments supporting the efficacy of general
deterrence are specious.' 45
It seems, therefore, that in order to countenance the death penalty at
all, Georgia's prosecutors and courts are forced to place undue reliance
on the retributive justification for capital punishment. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has made clear that the government must proceed with
extraordinary caution when pursuing or upholding capital punishment
under this rationale, because "[w]hen the law punishes by death, it risks
its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the constitutional
commitment to decency and restraint." '46 Furthermore, the inconsis-
tency with which the death penalty is applied only undermines the com-
munity values that retributive justice allegedly seeks to vindicate.'47
Even if the retributive justification is accepted, "[a]n expression of com-
munity outrage carries the legitimacy of law only if it rests on fair and
careful consideration, as free as possible from passion or prejudice."' 48
Since pure vengeance as a constitutionally valid aim of the State is dubi-
ous at best,'4 9 Georgia's practical application of the death penalty will
rarely, if ever, effectively contribute to any legitimate penal purpose and
is therefore unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
145. Furman, 408 U.S. at 302 (Brennan, J., concurring).
146. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008) (noting that of the principal
rationales under which punishment is justified, retribution is the one that "most often can
contradict the law's own ends"), modified on denial of reh'g, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008).
147. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[I]f the deliberate
extinguishment of human life has any effect at all [on the 'community's moral code'], it more
likely tends to lower our respect for life and brutalize our values.").
148. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 518 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("As the history of the
punishment of death in this country shows, our society wishes to prevent crime; we have no desire
to kill criminals simply to get even with them."). But see Harris, 513 U.S. at 517-18 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (Since "rehabilitation plays no role[,] incapacitation is largely irrelevant
... when the alternative of life imprisonment without possibility of parole is available[,] and the
assumption that death provides a greater deterrent than other penalties is unsupported by
persuasive evidence .... [T]he principal justification for the death penalty is retribution
(footnotes omitted)).
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G. The Proportionality Review as Applied to Specific Defendants
1. PROCEDURAL COMPONENTS OF THE APPELLATE REVIEW
OWED TO A CAPITAL CONVICT
Noting that "[t]he constitutional principle of proportionality has
been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century," 5 ' the
Supreme Court has outlined the "objective criteria," shaped by the
Court's own precedent, that should guide a reviewing court's propor-
tionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment, "including (i) the grav-
ity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions."' 1 For instance, with respect to the second criterion, the Court in
Solem v. Helm observed that "it may be helpful to compare the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more serious
crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is
some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive." '52
Thus, it ought to be relevant to the Supreme Court of Georgia, as it
undertakes its mandatory proportionality analysis for a particular capital
convict, if other individuals found guilty of similar crimes within the
State of Georgia have received sentences of imprisonment rather than
death. Moreover, the Georgia court should be obligated to account for
other cases in which a defendant was never threatened with capital pun-
ishment at all, despite being found guilty of a crime objectively worse
than that of the particular defendant whose sentence is being reviewed
(for example, by killing a greater number of people, killing in a particu-
larly brutal manner, or killing under more disturbing circumstances).
The Supreme Court of Georgia's failure to properly undertake the com-
parative analysis described by the Helm Court, and the resultant acquies-
cence in the inconsistent application of the death penalty against
criminal defendants within the state, is one of many indications that the
state's capital-sentencing procedures are unconstitutional and should be
struck down.
By using the Atlanta Joumal-Constitution/Rankin database' 5 3 to
150. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983).
15 I. Id. at 292.
152. Id. at 291.
153. Through the use of court and prison records to identify convictions, trial transcripts,
police reports, newspaper articles, and a variety of other documents and resources to catalog the
details of each crime, several investigative reporters, researchers, and database specialists
affiliated with the Atlanta-Journal Constitution compiled a database assembling the facts of 2,328
murder convictions in the decade spanning 1995 to 2004. The research team analyzed the data
through multiple regression analyses and presented their findings in a four-day series of articles
featured in the newspaper. The underlying database itself consists of coded and mathematically
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analyze cases between 1995 and 2004, it becomes apparent that a signif-
icant number of defendants, who were convicted of a subset of crimes
similar in nature to that for which a very small minority face death,
either (a) never confronted the threat of capital punishment because the
prosecuting attorney did not seek it, or (b) avoided a death sentence,
notwithstanding the district attorney's decision to pursue it. In some of
the latter cases, the defendant never went to trial because he entered into
a plea bargain with the prosecution, while in other cases a jury deter-
mined that imprisonment was the more appropriate punishment for the
crime.
Regardless of how such defendants managed to evade death, how-
ever, the Supreme Court of Georgia would not consider any of their
cases when deciding whether a death-row inmate's sentence was propor-
tionate to his crime and was imposed upon him in a nonarbitrary fash-
ion, even if the facts supporting the conviction were nearly identical. An
examination of the details of such cases leaves one struggling to ascer-
tain how and why one defendant's crime could be considered so mani-
festly more extreme, atrocious, and vile that he should be subjected to
death, while the others are spared. Of course, the grave and ultimately
insurmountable problem with the State of Georgia's supreme court
review process as it now stands is that the court has no method to
account for the many times in which judges, juries, and prosecutors
show mercy, instead focusing its study only on the times (however few
in proportion to the total) when the death penalty was assessed.
2. SPECIFIC MURDER CASES AS COMPARATORS:
A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE
As noted above,"5 4 this article will refrain from specifying the
details of any death-penalty cases for which avenues of appeal still
remain. Nonetheless, the heretofore abstract discussion of the mandatory
review process would benefit from the inclusion of a more concrete
example of how the review procedure was intended to and ought to be
carried out, as compared to how it actually materializes in practice.
Accordingly, the article here proffers a hypothetical death-row inmate,
"J. Doe," whose fictional crime and personal characteristics are loosely
based on the actions and traits (as determined by the respective fact find-
ers) of real defendants who have been convicted of capital murder and
who face execution as a result.
manipulable information related to an array of relevant factors-including the racial profiles of
victim and defendant, the county in which the crime was tried, and the existence of specific
aggravating circumstances-that can be utilized for additional research and analysis.
154. See supra note 37.
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Mr. Doe, in this example, will be a white male in his mid-twenties,
who grew up in an impoverished and broken home in Imaginary County,
Georgia-a jurisdiction in which the district attorney seeks the death
penalty at virtually every possible opportunity, and where Mr. Doe was
tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by a jury after a half day of
deliberation. The district attorney of Imaginary County sporadically
offers plea bargains, but does so without following any official or unof-
ficial policy; Mr. Doe was never given the opportunity to submit to a
plea. The facts as established by the trial record and taken as true are as
follows:
1. Mr. Doe was a petty drug dealer and regular drug user, with a
long record of criminal mischief dating back to his youth. Aside from a
minor drunken altercation outside of a bar four years before he was
arrested for murder, however, he had no history of violence.
2. At the victims' invitation, Mr. Doe entered the apartment of "Al
Victim" and "Bob Victim," brothers who, like Mr. Doe, were white men
and in their mid-twenties. Al Victim was considered one of the major
drug dealers in the neighborhood and had been twice convicted of
domestic abuse for hitting his girlfriends, but had managed to avoid any
trouble with the police over the year-long interval immediately preced-
ing his death. Bob Victim did not have a criminal record; his main char-
acter flaw appeared to be an inability to hold down a job for any
extended period of time.
3. Mr. Doe was found guilty of shooting Al Victim twice (once in
the shoulder and once in the head) and Bob Victim once in chest. Fol-
lowing the clear and competent testimony of the prosecution's expert
witnesses, the defense called into question the integrity of the forensic
evidence that had been introduced-specifically arguing that the broth-
ers' two dogs had mutilated their owners' bodies. The crime scene also
had been corrupted by the neighbor who found the victims two days
later and possibly by one or more unidentified individuals who an eye-
witness believed had entered the apartment to steal cash and other valu-
ables before the police were called.
4. Mr. Doe testified that the brothers, mostly upon the instigation of
Al Victim, attacked him, and he therefore shot both men in self-defense.
From the time that he was taken into police custody, Mr. Doe consist-
ently claimed that Al Victim had accused Mr. Doe of interfering with
Al's drug trade and that Al had pinned Mr. Doe to the ground while
brandishing a gun. Mr. Doe stated that he was able to recover the gun in
the ensuing struggle and use it as the murder weapon. Mr. Doe was less
clear about the imminence of the threat that Bob Victim had posed. All
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three men were under the influence of illegal drugs at the time of the
incident.
5. Mr. Doe had his stepsister pick him up and drive him out of
state, initially without any explanation as to why. His stepsister was a
drug addict, and he convinced her to comply by promising her drugs or
money in compensation (although he told her that he was not carrying
either at the time) if she did not ask questions. He disposed of the mur-
der weapon on the Georgia side of the Alabama-Georgia border.
6. The aggravating circumstances for which the jury could have
justified the imposition of a death sentence were (a) Mr. Doe killed two
victims and the homicide was not justifiable or excusable in either
case, 55 and/or (b) Mr. Doe committed the homicides to gain something
of value, such as drugs or the money alleged to be missing from the
brothers' apartment.
15 6
After a number of evidentiary challenges and challenges to the
prosecutor's behavior before and during the trial, Mr. Doe's attorneys
believe that their client's best hope for commutation of his death sen-
tence is judicial recognition that capital punishment is out of proportion
to the sentences typically received by other individuals convicted of
drug-related double murders in Georgia. The defense team is extremely
concerned, however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia will neglect to
incorporate a significant number of relevant cases-a subset in which
the defendant was convicted of killing multiple persons and illicit sub-
stances appear to have been a factor-into its proportionality review,
since the defendants in those cases managed to avoid a capital sentence.
As a result, the Supreme Court of Georgia will have no conception of
the relative frequency with which death is imposed under such condi-
tions, and thus no way to accurately gauge the proportionality of Mr.
Doe's punishment to his crime pursuant to prevailing societal standards
and norms. Examples of such pertinent but neglected comparators,
which justify the defense team's concern, immediately follow:
1. Plea Bargain, No Trial-Octavious Stready: One example of a
case that would be relevant to accurately assessing the proportionality of
Mr. Doe's sentence, but which would not be considered under current
Georgia state supreme court practices, is that of Octavious Stready, a
black male who committed his crime at age eighteen and who never
went to trial.1 57 Stready entered into a plea bargain whereby he will
155. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(2) (2008). Each murder occurred during the commission
of another felony (i.e., the other murder); therefore both murders would be capital felonies and
thus subject to the rule.
156. Id. § 17-10-30(b)(4).
157. See Beth Warren, Teen Gets Life for 2002 Murder, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 16, 2004, at
C3, available at 2004 WLNR 14167039.
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serve, two back-to-back life sentences plus ten years in prison. Stready
pled guilty to killing a twenty-six-year-old male who had asked Stready
to help him purchase a small amount of drugs; the two men subse-
quently got into an argument over the transaction. He also pled guilty to
killing the man's nineteen-year-old girlfriend, who was in the truck with
them at the time. Stready may have killed an unarmed security guard
who tried to detain him as well, although he testified at his co-perpetra-
tor's trial that his co-perpetrator was the one who killed the guard.
Stready also stole and later wrecked his victims' truck. 15 8
The parallels to Mr. Doe's case are numerous; if anything,
Stready's crime could be considered more serious because of the greater
number of people killed and the clearer evidence of his malicious moti-
vations in perpetrating the crime. Yet the Supreme Court of Georgia
would never incorporate Stready's case into its proportionality analysis
for the simple reason that it did not go to trial. The fact that the presiding
district attorney believed that this crime was not one in which death
would be the only suitable punishment, and instead preferred to plea
bargain with the defendant, is indicative of the fact that prevailing "com-
munity values" do not deem murders of this nature to be the utmost in
atrociousness. It also makes the fact that Mr. Doe was never offered a
chance to plea to the charges in order to avoid death in his case all the
more problematic.
2. Death Penalty Never Pursued-Ambrocio Valdivia: Similarly,
the case of Ambrocio Valdivia 159 would not be considered by the
Supreme Court of Georgia in its proportionality review for Mr. Doe or
any other defendant, notwithstanding its obvious usefulness for compar-
ative purposes. A jury found Valdivia guilty of shooting and killing two
men and wounding a third, after the victims had knocked on Valdivia's
apartment door during a party at his apartment complex under the mis-
taken belief that he would sell them beer. 6 ' The district attorney in this
case never pursued the death penalty, and Valdivia was sentenced to two
life terms for the murders and a consecutive twenty years of imprison-
ment for the aggravated assault against the third victim.' 6 ' This case,
when compared to Mr. Doe's, exemplifies the discrepancies in sentenc-
ing that can arise and remain uncorrected, since the Supreme Court of
Georgia has no mechanism for accounting for even drastic differences in
prosecutorial decisions of whether or when to pursue a death sentence.
3. Mercy of the Sentencer-Rudolph Ottis: Finally, even if the
158. See id.
159. Valdivia v. State, 657 S.E.2d 230 (Ga. 2008).
160. See id. at 231.
161. See id.
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State does seek capital punishment, a jury may decide that life without
parole or another prison term is a more appropriate sentence. Although
such flexibility allows a jury to show mercy to a defendant, the ultimate
effect is that the administration of the death penalty becomes more a
matter of chance-dependent on the disposition of a given jury pool or
sentencing judge-and less about ensuring that each defendant receives
a sentence proportionate to the severity of his crime and to the sentences
of others who have committed similar crimes. The state supreme court
also fails to consider such cases-where the district attorney makes
death an option, but the sentencer chooses imprisonment instead-in its
proportionality review, which serves to further distort the court's percep-
tion of community values and its assessment of whether the punishment
is commensurate with the crime.
In Ottis v. State,162 for example, Rudolph Ottis received life with
parole for the murder of two half sisters, a fifteen-year-old and a seven-
year-old, both black. The girls were bound with duct tape and stabbed
and slashed to death after Ottis and three co-conspirators illegally
entered the girls' mother's apartment as part of a drug deal.'63 It was
later determined that the motive for the murders was to prevent the girls
from later identifying one of the participants in the robbery/drug deal."6
Given the young age of the victims, their status as witnesses and inno-
cent bystanders, and the fact that their murders were carried out method-
ically and gruesomely, it becomes difficult to fathom how defendant
Ottis could be considered less culpable or less deserving of the death
penalty than Mr. Doe. Yet the Supreme Court of Georgia's proportional-
ity review currently avoids these comparisons, which, if properly under-
taken, would surely at least give rise to concerns that Mr. Doe's sentence
does not accord with the sentences given to similarly situated
defendants.
Ill. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
This third section of the article focuses on a challenge to Georgia's
death-penalty procedures that is distinct from but related to the previ-
ously discussed Eighth Amendment option for redressing the system's
discriminatory practices: namely, the potential for an equal protection
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. To evidence the viability of
such an argument, this section proceeds in four distinct parts. It begins
by summarizing the elements of a cognizable equal protection claim and
contests purported policy concerns about permitting equal protection
162. 517 S.E.2d 525, 525-26 (Ga.1999).
163. Id. at 526.
164. Id.
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challenges to capital punishment. The article then demonstrates that
despite substantial judicial precedent favoring "as applied" equal protec-
tion claims, the Supreme Court has failed to fully address them in the
context of Georgia's capital-punishment law. Next, the article considers
the proper balance between the discretionary judgments of state actors
and the equal protection rights of defendants thereby affected and
explores Supreme Court jurisprudence on the proper use of statistical
evidence to show if and when this balance has become misaligned. The
final part of this section of the article focuses specifically on the role of
district attorneys during death penalty proceedings, examining constitu-
tional constraints on their ability to select for whom they will seek capi-
tal sentencing and describing the appropriate use of statistical evidence
to prove discriminatory abuses of such prosecutorial discretion.
A. Overview of Strict Scrutiny in the Criminal Justice System
1. EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE AND STRICT SCRUTINY
Over the years, and in all areas of public life, the Supreme Court
"has consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people whose insti-
tutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."" 65 The Court's
abhorrence of racially discriminatory practices in the public sector has
led to the development of its strict-scrutiny jurisprudence, under which
all governmental racial classifications-even those implemented for
benign purposes or which burden or benefit both races equally-must be
analyzed. 166 Under strict scrutiny, the government is charged with prov-
ing that racial classifications are "narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests." '167 Strict scrutiny is necessary to
guard against racial classifications that are "motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."' 68
In the most straightforward cases, the invidious and impermissible
racial discrimination will be written on the face of the statute. However,
a law can be "impartial in appearance," yet "applied and administered by
165. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (alteration in original) (quoting Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
166. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (citing, inter alia, Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 651 (1993)). In Johnson, the Court held that strict scrutiny was the proper
standard of review for a correction facility's unwritten policy of segregating inmates based on
their respective racial identities upon their entrance into the prison. Id. at 502, 509. The Court
refused to entertain a more deferential standard of review, notwithstanding the asserted connection
between the questioned practice and the legitimate purported penological objective of preventing
violence caused by racial gangs. Id. at 507.
167. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
168. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances." '169 This too is a "denial of equal justice ... within the
prohibition of the Constitution."17 The opportunity for such discrimina-
tory implementation of a facially neutral statute may be more likely to
occur and more difficult to detect when the statute's enforcement is
committed to the "unrestrained will of a single public officer" who is not
inhibited by any "rules by which [the law's] impartial execution can be
secured or partiality and oppression prevented." '71 The party challeng-
ing the statute may provide facts regarding "the ordinances in actual
operation" that
establish an administration directed so exclusively against a particular
class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion, that,
whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they
are applied by the public authorities.., with a mind so unequal and
oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of [the]
equal protection of the laws ....
When no reason for gross racial discrepancies is shown, the Court has
held that "the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists
except hostility to the race" to whose disadvantage the statute is
applied.1 73 Notably, however, the Court also has maintained that,
depending on the surrounding circumstances and the magnitude of the
disparity, the party challenging the governmental statute or action often
will need to provide additional evidence of a discriminatory intent in
enacting or effecting the statute beyond that which can be inferred from
the disparate impact alone. 174 Since discriminatory intentions often man-
ifest covertly or even unconsciously, the requirement of proving this ele-
ment through hard evidence that goes beyond statistical disparities can
impose a substantially higher burden on the challenger.
2. EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The U.S. Supreme Court has an extensive history of mandating pro-
cedural safeguards and restraints when unconstitutional considerations
169. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
170. Id. at 374.
171. Id. at 372-73 (quoting with approval City of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217 (1878)).
172. Id. at 373.
173. Id. at 374 (finding a Fourteenth Amendment violation under a facially neutral state statute
when approximately 200 Chinese citizens were denied a certain permit, while 80 other non-
Chinese persons were allowed to carry on the same business under similar conditions).
174. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[O]ur cases have not
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a
racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact.").
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of race have the potential to infiltrate the judicial process. The Court
"has repeatedly stated that prosecutorial discretion cannot be exercised
on the basis of race." 17 5 In addition to this general proposition, the Court
has issued specific holdings regarding the impermissibility of race-based
judgments in the context of peremptory challenges.176 Moreover,
Supreme Court decisions related to more general prejudices lead to the
reasonable inference that race-based judgments would be particularly
pernicious. For instance, prosecutorial arguments may not contain
improper remarks in violation of a defendant's right to a fair and impar-
tial trial; 17 7 therefore, it would see that allusions to race would be an
obvious example of a prejudicial and constitutional improper statement.
Likewise, the Court has required a change of venue when a community
is afflicted with widespread preconceived biases against a defendant
based on negative pretrial publicity;1 78 it is not too great a logical leap to
infer that the Court might be sensitive, at least in extreme case, to simi-
lar community biases against defendants based on race, particularly if
the local media inflamed such racial prejudices in the course of pretrial
coverage.
Decisions containing language that appears to mitigate the impor-
tance of the Fourteenth Amendment to the judiciary in any respect, no
matter how limited the precedential effect of such holdings and dicta,
ultimately are construed as, and have been criticized as being a result of
the Court "ignoring its own jurisprudence demanding the highest scru-
tiny on issues of death and race" and thereby "fail[ing] to do justice to a
claim in which both those elements are intertwined-an occasion calling
for the most sensitive inquiry a court can conduct." '79 Most certainly,
"[t]he protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment are not left at
the courtroom door."' 8 ° The Court must be constantly vigilant, since
"racial and other forms of discrimination still remain a fact of life, in the
administration of justice as in our society as a whole. Perhaps today that
discrimination takes a form more subtle than before. But it is not less
real or pernicious. '
As a result, the exacting standards of strict scrutiny continue to be
applicable to all elements of the criminal-justice system, including the
175. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.30 (1987) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598, 608 (1985); United States. v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448 (1962)).
176. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
177. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
178. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
179. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 346 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942)).
181. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1979).
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district attorney's selection of which cases to pursue for capital punish-
ment. In this respect, harsher treatment of black defendants as compared
to white defendants is not the only racial prejudice that can give rise to
constitutional concerns; a "diminished willingness to render [a death]
sentence when blacks are victims reflects a devaluation of the lives of
black persons" as well.182 Implicit racial biases and unchecked
prejudices giving rise to discriminatory decisions by public officials
contradict the principle of equal protection of the laws, regardless of
whether the party discriminated against is the defendant or the victim.
Georgia's current capital-punishment scheme provides undue leeway for
racial politics to interfere with fair and consistent decision making, such
that prosecutors and other state actors are able to treat the assailants of
white victims significantly more harshly than those of black victims. 8 3
3. POLICY CONCERNS ABOUT EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES
TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The McCleskey court invoked certain policy concerns with respect
to the prudence of hearing claims of impermissible racial (or sexual)
biases in the capital-punishment system, arguing that similar claims
"based upon any arbitrary variable, such as the defendant's facial char-
acteristics, or the physical attractiveness of the defendant or the victim"
would thereafter be inevitable." 4 The Court's attempt to juxtapose
charges of systemic discrimination made by or to the detriment of non-
white persons to similar such charges made by arbitrarily formulated
groups, and to claim that full consideration of the former would result in
an unmanageable profusion of the latter, is neither plausible nor compel-
ling: no theoretical, capriciously assembled group has faced the exten-
sive and sordid history of discrimination that is attached to the
experience of racial minorities in this country; there is no judicially rec-
ognized precedent or constitutional foundation establishing the need for
special care to eliminate prejudice against these hypothetical random
groups from the criminal-justice system; and the few empirical studies
that the Court cites as potential evidence for claims of bias by nonracial
groups are nowhere near as numerous and sophisticated as those that
182. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. Cf Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27, 106-07
(1984) ("Since death penalty prosecutions require large allocations of scarce prosecutorial
resources, prosecutors must choose a small number of cases to receive this expensive treatment. In
making these choices they may favor homicides that are visible and disturbing to the majority of
the community, and these will tend to be white-victim homicides.").
184. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 317 (footnote omitted).
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specifically focus on race disparities. 85
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in McCleskey also explains
why, regardless of the validity of an equal protection claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the existence of simply a discriminatory effect
necessitates invalidation of the offending statute under the Constitution,
even if discriminatory intent cannot be demonstrated:
Once we can identify a pattern of arbitrary sentencing outcomes, we
can say that a defendant runs a risk of being sentenced arbitrarily. It
is thus immaterial whether the operation of an impermissible influ-
ence such as race is intentional. While the Equal Protection Clause
forbids racial discrimination, and intent may be critical in a success-
ful claim under that provision, the Eighth Amendment has its own
distinct focus: whether punishment comports with social standards of
rationality and decency. It may be, as in this case [of racial discrimi-
nation], that on occasion an influence that makes punishment arbi-
trary is also proscribed under another constitutional provision. That
does not mean, however, that the standard for determining an Eighth
Amendment violation is superseded by the standard for determining a
violation under this other provision.186
Under this rationale, the majority's concern about a proliferation of
accusations of unfair systemic biases made by disparate groups repre-
senting various unprotected classes becomes inconsequential: if "strik-
ing evidence" indicated that members of some other group, categorized
by a characteristic irrelevant to their culpability, were disproportionately
and unjustifiably targeted for death, this too would be "repugnant to
deeply rooted conceptions of fairness." '87 Although our nation's history
suggests that racial prejudices are more likely than other types of dis-
crimination to undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice system,
the demonstrable existence of more widespread problems would demand
rectification as well.
It bears emphasis, however, that the prospect of capital sentencing
decisions being influenced by race is especially invidious. To an unpar-
alleled extent, the laws and Constitution of the country-as embodied in
"[t]hree constitutional amendments and numerous statutes"-reflect a
185. See id. at 328-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan outlined "Georgia's legacy of
a race-conscious criminal justice system" and the U.S. Supreme Court's "own recognition of the
persistent danger that racial attitudes may affect criminal proceedings." Id. at 328-29. Justice
Brennan emphasized how the State of Georgia in particular "operated openly and formally
precisely the type of dual system the evidence shows is still effectively in place," wherein the law
"expressly differentiated between crimes committed by and against blacks and whites." Id. at 329.
The fact that the Court continues to engage in "unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from
our criminal justice system" signifies "not the elimination of the problem but its persistence." Id.
at 333 (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Id. at 323 n.l.
187. Id. at 339.
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fundamental moral commitment to eradicating the pernicious effects of
racism.188 The judicial and constitutional traditions of exposing and dis-
mantling racial bigotry and inequity in the public sector, combined with
a growing body of research demonstrating that no other traits unrelated
to the legal elements of the crime (with the exception, perhaps, of the
particular Georgia county in which the charges are brought) are as
strongly correlated to a death penalty outcome as the racial backgrounds
of the defendant and victim,'89 make clear that race considerations are a
unique concern in equal protection jurisprudence, rendering "slippery
slide" arguments unavailing.
B. De Facto Statutory Factors Render the Statute
Unconstitutional As Applied
1. RECOGNITION OF THE VIABILITY OF "AS APPLIED"
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
The Supreme Court has expressly proscribed the use of aggravating
factors that are "constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to
the sentencing process" and has specified racial considerations in partic-
ular as prohibited. 9 ° "What we have held to be unconstitutional if
included in the language of the statute surely cannot be constitutional
because it is a de facto characteristic of the system."' 9 ' Similarly, Justice
Douglas, in his concurrence in the Furman decision that invalidated a
former version of Georgia's death-penalty statute, acknowledged the
applicability of this equal protection argument: "Any law which is non-
discriminatory on its face may be applied in such a way as to violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." '92
It has been demonstrated that the institution of capital punishment
in Georgia as it currently stands is indeed racially discriminatory, in that
it "provides heightened protection against murder 'for whites only,"'
except for a certain category of murders so severe and brutal that juries
consistently impose the death penalty without regard to the race of either
the victim or the offender.' 93 Even if "the law is theoretically impartial"
188. Id. at 341 (internal punctuation omitted).
189. Across the state, Georgia prosecutors were more than twice as likely to pursue capital
punishment when the victim was white. Rankin et al., supra note 50. Statistical differentials
between counties obviously depend on the jurisdictions being compared, but can be even more
substantial; a murder defendant in Clayton County was thirteen times more likely to face the death
penalty than a similarly charged defendant in nearby Fulton County. Id. Of course, the fact that
intercounty discrepancies are in some cases of a greater magnitude than racial disparities does not
render the latter any less objectionable. See also supra note 58 and sources cited therein.
190. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983).
191. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 355-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
192. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
193. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Vogell, supra note 78
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and "[j]uries do not intentionally favour" certain kinds of defendants
over others, a system of punishment fraught with so many inherent
defects that render unequal application an inevitability raises serious and
possibly insurmountable constitutional concerns.' 94 Therefore, in addi-
tion to the Eighth Amendment challenges described in the previous sec-
tion of the article, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims
remain a viable safeguard against this overwhelming and unacceptable
potential for discriminatory application of Georgia's capital-punishment
statute.
2. EXTANT FAILURE TO FULLY CONSIDER "AS APPLIED" CHALLENGES
The Supreme Court has broached the issue of "as applied" equal
protection challenges to Georgia's death-penalty statute, but has so far
failed to give the matter a comprehensive hearing that considers all the
potential opportunities for discriminatory implementation by the full
range of pertinent state actors. For instance, in McCleskey, the Supreme
Court dismissed the defendant's claim that the State of Georgia was in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause by allowing the capital-punish-
ment statute to remain in force despite its allegedly discriminatory appli-
cation. 195 The Court noted that under its equal protection jurisprudence:
"[d]iscrininatory purpose".. . implies more than intent as volition or
intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the deci-
sionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely
"in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
1 96
The Court refused to infer a discriminatory purpose in this case, since
there were legitimate reasons for the Georgia legislature to adopt a
capital-punishment statute. 197 Yet even if this position is countenanced,
it allows the statute to survive only a facial challenge; it does not pre-
clude the possibility that the state actors who are charged with imple-
menting statutory mandates are performing their duties in an
impermissibly discriminatory manner.
Indeed, the McCleskey Court noted that, when examining the con-
stitutionality of death-penalty procedures, the judiciary "ha[s] not
stopped at the face of a statute, but ha[s] probed the application of stat-
(quoting criminologist and death penalty researcher Ray Paternoster: "Black victims have to be
really, really brutalized before they're treated the same as a white-victim case.").
194. Furman, 408 U.S. at 251 (Douglas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting LEwis E. LAWES, LIFE AND DEATH IN SING SING 155-60 (1928)).
195. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297-99.
196. Id. at 298 (alterations in original) (quoting Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)).
197. Id. at 298-99.
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utes to particular cases."' 98 In other words, the Supreme Court recog-
nizes its obligation to look beyond the plain text of a statute to assess
how it is actually applied. Thus, even if some restrained construction of
a statute would be constitutional, a broad interpretation given to it by
district attorneys and judges will necessitate careful appellate review in
order to ensure both that sentencers are not handing down disproportion-
ately severe penalties under the guise of legislative consent and
approval, and that none of the parties to the process (district attorneys,
judges, and jurors) are exploiting overbroad statutory language and
appellate-court deference to allow discriminatory practices to infect the
system. 199
3. OVERBROAD STATUTORY TERMS AND
IMPERMISSIBLE CONSIDERATIONS
A statute cannot survive judicial scrutiny if it is written in terms
that are sufficiently vague or overbroad so as to allow impermissible
factors to infiltrate the decision-making processes of state actors. Thus,
even if the Georgia death-penalty statute is constitutional on its face, the
law as it has been applied to many capital defendants renders it
unconstitutional.
What may be said of the validity of a law on the books and what may
be done with the law in its application do, or may, lead to quite dif-
ferent conclusions. It would seem to be incontestable that the death
penalty inflicted on one defendant is "unusual" if it discriminates
against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or
class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the
play of such prejudices. 2"
The discrepancies between the personal characteristics of those who are
sentenced to death and those who are spared under Georgia law-in
particular, the racial profile of the defendant's victim and the county in
which the defendant's case is tried-indicate that the procedures insti-
tuted by the Georgia legislature to foster consistency and fairness in the
application of capital punishment actually have "give[n] room for the
play of such prejudices."' 0 '
"[A] law that in terms said that blacks, those who never went
beyond the fifth grade in school, those who made less than $3,000 a
198. Id. at 304-05.
199. Cf Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a
Supreme Court of Georgia interpretation of a particular statutory aggravating circumstance, since
notwithstanding an adequate limiting definition of the phrase, its interpretation in the case at hand
was too broad to adequately guide the sentencing jury's discretion).
200. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
201. See id.
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year, or those who were unpopular or unstable should be the only people
executed" would "plainly fall." ' Thus, "[a] law which in the overall
view reaches that result in practice has no more sanctity than a law
which in terms provides the same."20 3 Likewise, then, if the terms of the
Georgia capital-punishment statute expressly imposed a death sentence
on those found guilty of murder in certain counties or for killing white
victims, while sparing those who committed similar crimes in other
Georgia counties or against black victims, the Georgia and U.S.
Supreme Courts would not hesitate to strike down such a law. The
courts should be equally zealous in invalidating legislation that has the
same practical effect.
C. Use of Statistical Evidence for Equal Protection
Claims in Death-Penalty Cases
1. THE BALANCE BETWEEN DISCRETIONARY JUDGMENTS AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The Supreme Court has attempted to distinguish equal protection
claims in the context of capital punishment by arguing that in areas
(such as jury selection) where statistics are considered an acceptable
form of proof of discriminatory intent, the party against whom such sta-
tistics are presented has the opportunity to explain the disparity.20 4 In the
death-penalty context, no such opportunity exists. In McCleskey, for
example, the Court rightly noted that jurors cannot and should not be
forced "to testify to the motives and influences that led to their ver-
dict."20 5 However, the Court then went on to claim that "the policy con-
siderations behind a prosecutor's traditionally 'wide discretion' suggest
the impropriety of our requiring prosecutors to defend their decisions to
seek death penalties .... 206 The Court makes no mention of the fact
that allowing such "wide discretion" to remain unchallenged provides an
opportunity for implicit biases to permeate the decision-making process.
Thus, if the Court maintains the dubious position that "public policy
concerns" directly render prosecutorial and sentencing decisions unre-
viewable, a thorough rendition of the statutory proportionality review
becomes all the more imperative in order to guard against the influence
of any improper motivations for which neither the prosecutor nor the
jury otherwise would be held accountable. It is critical to remember that
202. Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
203. Id. (footnote omitted).
204. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296 (1987).
205. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. v.
Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593 (1907)).
206. Id. (footnote omitted).
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sentencing discretion "is a means, not an end," and procedures that are
complicit with abuses of this discretion, which allow the race of the
defendant or of the victim to supersede evaluation of each crime and
each individual as a whole, are "antithetical to the very rationale for
granting" such discretion in the first place.2 °7
2. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING STATISTICAL
EVIDENCE IN EQUAL PROTECTION CASES
McCleskey v. Kemp specifically addressed the question of "whether
a complex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considerations
enter into capital sentencing determinations" can prove that a defen-
dant's "capital sentence is unconstitutional under the Eighth or Four-
teenth Amendment.1 20 8 Although the holding of the McCleskey Court-
that the "Baldus study" 209 failed to prove that the defendant's constitu-
tional rights had been violated-is inherently limited to the particular
circumstances of the case, the decision is nevertheless indicative of how
the Court may approach future claims that are bolstered by similar statis-
tical evidence regarding the constitutionality of Georgia's death-penalty
procedures. Importantly, the Court emphasized the essentiality of discre-
tionary judgments to the criminal-justice process and indicated that it
"would demand exceptionally clear proof before [it] would infer that the
discretion has been abused."21 However, this language in itself does not
preclude future use of the Baldus study (which was praised for its thor-
oughness and accuracy by several of the McCleskey opinion's dissenting
Justices), 21' particularly in conjunction with the additional evidence of
procedural shortcomings and racial biases that has since been collected
and considered compelling by currently seated Justices.21 2 These find-
ings, considered collectively, may rise to the persuasive value that the
McCleskey opinion deemed necessary and that the Baldus study, consid-
ered in isolation, was unable to achieve. At a minimum, the Court's
rejection of the use of statistics in one case does not foreclose the possi-
207. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 282-83 (majority opinion).
209. David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of
the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CIjM. L. & CrIMINOLOGY 661 (1983).
210. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
211. See id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the "statistics have particular force
because most of them are the product of sophisticated multiple-regression analysis ... [which] is
particularly well suited to identify the influence of impermissible considerations in sentencing");
id. at 354 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contrasting the Baldus study to previously rejected
statistical evidence that was "incomplete, not directly relevant to [the] individual claim, and
statistically insufficient" and finding that the Baldus study was "of such a different level of
sophistication and detail that it simply cannot be rejected on those grounds").
212. See, e.g., Walker v. Georgia, 129 S. Ct. 453, 455 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing a
law review note that analyzed and critiqued Georgia's death-penalty-review procedures).
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bility that a similarly structured but more thorough presentation of data
could be utilized in the future.
The McCleskey Court also outlined its traditional approach to
assessing alleged equal protection violations and indicated how statisti-
cal evidence might factor into the analysis. Specifically, the party assert-
ing an equal protection violation has the burden of proving both the
existence of "purposeful discrimination" and of a "discriminatory effect"
in the party's particular case. 1 3 The Court has allowed statistical evi-
dence of racially disparate treatment to be used as proof of an intent to
discriminate in a number of circumstances; and although the disparities
demonstrated by the data typically "must present a 'stark' pattern to be
accepted as the sole proof of discriminat[ion]," ' 4 in certain contexts,
such as jury selection, the Court will find violations "even when the
statistical pattern does not approach [such] extremes."
21 5
D. Limitations to Prosecutorial Discretion and Demonstrating
Equal Protection Violations
1. COMMON LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON
UNBRIDLED PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
It is difficult to imagine any reason why a district attorney would
choose to more vigorously prosecute and punish cases in which the vic-
tim is white rather than black, beyond blatant racism, appeasing white
constituents, or some similarly invidious or inappropriate motivation. Of
course, a response that relative to the victim's race, the defendant's race
is, on average, considerably less influential on prosecutorial decisions-
and indeed, white defendants are actually more likely to end up on death
row because they more frequently kill white victims-is also a non-
starter; any differential treatment based on racial classifications, regard-
less of the group (victims or defendants) in which the discrepancy
occurs, violates the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws
for the victim, the victim's family and loved ones, and the defendant
alike.
Nor should district attorneys be granted an exemption from the
demands of strict scrutiny under the guise of prosecutorial discretion
when their actions effectuate an impermissible form of racial discrimina-
tion. The U.S. Supreme Court in the past has "refused to defer to state
213. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967) and Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)); see
supra Part III.A. 1-2, for a more detailed account of the elements of an equal protection claim.
214. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293.
215. Id. at 294 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.13 (1977)).
[Vol. 64:175
2009] PROPORTIONALITY AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 223
officials' judgments on race in other areas where those officials tradi-
tionally exercise substantial discretion," such as where prosecutors have
abused their ability to make peremptory challenges to strike jurors,
doing so on the impermissible basis of race.216 Likewise, then, strict
scrutiny is constitutionally necessary, since the unfettered prosecutorial
decisions of district attorneys in Georgia have resulted in drastically dif-
ferent outcomes between races so as to give rise to an inference of sys-
temic racial biases in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.217
Georgia's state supreme court appears convinced that the state's
district attorneys do not have unfettered discretion to seek the death pen-
alty, but they pronounce this proposition in conclusory terms and fail to
provide any evidentiary support for such a position.218 The lone explana-
tion that the state court gives for its confidence in the forbearance of its
district attorneys and the soundness of the criminal-justice system is that
the district attorneys' decisions are based on "the exercise of profes-
sional judgment as to whether an aggravating circumstance exists,"
while the actual decision to impose death is entirely the province of the
jury.2 19 Georgia deems the fact that different prosecutors within the state
may vary markedly in their decisions to be of no constitutional signifi-
cance.22° Since the state courts have acquiesced in the exploitation of
these unguided discretionary judgments, without substantiating the ratio-
nale for their tolerance in light of evidence of gross racial disparities, the
U.S. Supreme Court is obligated by its own precedent and by the man-
dates of the Constitution to intervene.
2. THE USE OF STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES TO ANALYZE PROSECUTORIAL
BEHAVIOR AFTER MCCLEKSEY
The McCleskey Court attempted to distinguish equal protection
claims in the context of venire selection and employment decisions
(where statistical evidence is admissible to prove statutory violations)
from similar challenges to capital-sentencing procedures by arguing that,
216. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 512 (2005) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
89-96 (1986)).
217. See infra Part I.D.2-3, for a more thorough discussion of the limits of prosecutorial
discretion and the various statistical and evidentiary techniques that may be utilized to prove
abuses of this discretion; cf Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (holding that a
facially neutral statute was applied in a discriminatory fashion by state officials against persons of
Chinese heritage, rendering it unconstitutional).
218. See, e.g., Terrell v. State, 572 S.E.2d 595, 604 (Ga. 2002).
219. Crowe v. State, 458 S.E.2d 799, 812 (Ga. 1995).
220. Id.; see also Rower v. State, 443 S.E.2d 839, 841 (Ga. 1994) ("Testimony from other
district attorneys regarding the manner in which the death penalty is sought in their circuits, or the
manner in which plea bargains are reached, would be insufficient to show that the [District
Attorney for the county in which petitioner was tried] acted in an unconstitutional manner in [the
petitioner's] case.").
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in capital-punishment cases, the "decision to impose the death penalty is
made by a petit jury selected from a properly constituted venire," each
one distinct in its composition from the next, which then must consider
"innumerable factors" relating to the particular defendant and the facts
of his case.22 In contrast, according to the Court, "[t]he decisions of a
jury commission or of an employer over time are fairly attributable to
the commission or the employer. Therefore, an unexplained statistical
discrepancy can be said to indicate a consistent policy of the deci-
sionmaker.' '2 22 This distinction between the categories of cases is spe-
cious, however, given that the original determination of whether to
pursue the death penalty is the district attorney's, and the Court explic-
itly acknowledges that statistics are persuasive evidence for decisions
made by individuals in such positions of stable and identifiable
authority.
As with jury commissions and employers, statistics demonstrating
discriminatory patterns in prosecutorial decision making can evidence
the racial biases of individual district attorneys. The McCleskey Court
unpersuasively attempted to dismiss this point by grouping district attor-
neys as a statewide whole and then labeling the potential value of study-
ing their collective decision-making patterns as "questionable." '23 The
Court claimed that since their decisions to charge are made indepen-
dently, "coordination among district attorney offices across a State
would be relatively meaningless" and "any inference from statewide sta-
tistics to a prosecutorial 'policy' [would be] of doubtful relevance." '224
Even assuming the adequacy of the Court's argument against examining
statewide prosecutorial patterns in order to identify any widespread dis-
criminatory tendencies, the point regarding the potential discriminatory
tendencies of individual district attorneys would remain unaddressed.
Furthermore, the logic of the McCleskey Court's argument against
the use of statewide statistical data is also fatally flawed. In addition to
the aforementioned prevaricating language in the portion of the opinion
discussing district attorneys, the Court references (in support of its posi-
tion) the fact that under the Georgia Constitution, the voters of a particu-
lar county elect the District Attorney.225 Yet it seems that electing
district attorneys by local popular vote could render incumbent officials
more susceptible to racial politics and to pressures to uphold potential
countywide prejudices in order to safeguard their own reelection. More-
over, the Court's brief mention of the possibility or importance of
221. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294 (1987).
222. Id. at 295 n.15.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. Id. (citing GA. CONST. art. XI, § 8, cl. 1).
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interjurisdictional coordination in prosecutorial decision making is mis-
guided and misleading. The equal protection arguments and supporting
statistics are not concerned with proving some nefarious and conscious
statewide policy in favor of pursuing the death penalty only in white-
victim cases, but rather speak to the aggregate effect of racial politics
and latent prejudice as manifested through the separate actions of the
different district attorneys across the state. Such institutionalized racism
would also explain the discrepancies between jurisdictions, because the
local politics of some areas will be more resistant to these biases than
others.
3. EVIDENTIARY PROCEDURES FOR DEMONSTRATING
ABUSES OF DISCRETION
Since the majority opinion in McCleskey contributed only a foot-
note to addressing the potential of Fourteenth Amendment violations by
prosecutors as state actors in criminal proceedings, the question would
appear to remain open for further judicial scrutiny.226 Justice Black-
mun's dissenting opinion, recognizing the importance of this topic and
the inadequacy of the majority opinion's treatment thereof, laid out the
appropriate framework for this analysis. Specifically, a defendant chal-
lenging prosecutorial actions must prove the existence of purposeful dis-
crimination, but may do so by establishing a prima facie case wherein
"the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discrimina-
tory purpose. 2 27 Such an inference may be derived from a "disparity
[that] is sufficiently large, [such that] it is unlikely that it is due solely to
chance or accident. '228 The burden then shifts to the State to rebut the
inference, which it cannot do by "mere general assertions that its offi-
cials did not discriminate or that they properly performed their official
duties," but rather the State is required to demonstrate that the discrimi-
natory effect was due to "permissible racially neutral selection crite-
ria. ' 229 The party making the equal protection challenge also must show
that "he is a member of a group that is a recognizable, distinct class,
singled out for different treatment. 23 °
Within Georgia's death-penalty practices, the most problematic
classification is not based on the race of the defendant, but rather on the
race of the victim: the class of persons accused of or found guilty of
226. See id.
227. Id. at 351-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986)).
228. Id. at 352 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 494 n.13 (1977)).
229. Id. at 352 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 94).
230. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494).
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killing a white person suffer disproportionately harsh prosecutorial treat-
ment and sentencing. The McCleskey dissent forcefully argued that the
Baldus study alone should have been considered sufficient to establish a
prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, but the majority
remained unconvinced at the time. Since the decision in McCleskey was
handed down in 1987, however, additional research has confirmed the
original conclusions of the Baldus study, namely, that racial factors, par-
ticularly the race of the victim, have an independent effect on
prosecutorial decision making and on the ultimate outcome of homicide
cases in Georgia.23' Moreover, as noted above, the majority opinion in
McCleskey glossed over the issue of prosecutorial decision making and
declined to remark on the body of evidence showing that the victim's
race is "an especially significant factor" prior to the penalty phase of the
trial, when the prosecutor must choose whether to create the possibility
of a death sentence or to accept a maximum sentence of a term of life
imprisonment. 232 These omissions in judicial doctrine are ripe for con-
sideration by the Supreme Court, either as an alternative to or in con-
junction with the Eighth Amendment challenges described in the
previous section of this article.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent denial of certiorari in
Walker v. Georgia-in which Justices Stevens and Thomas each felt
compelled to append additional statements setting forth their respective
(and conflicting) views on the constitutionality of Georgia's death-
penalty procedures and the importance of the state's mandatory appel-
late review-the Court once again appears poised to analyze the institu-
tion of capital punishment within the State of Georgia. This analysis
could potentially have myriad repercussions for the legal and procedural
statutes governing death sentences nationwide.
231. The Baldus study demonstrated that, in explaining capital-sentencing outcomes, the race
of the victim was approximately equivalent to variables such as whether the defendant was the
prime mover in the homicide and whether the defendant had a prior record of a conviction for a
capital crime. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 355 nn.9-10 (noting that a defendant's chance of death
increases by a factor of 4.3 if the victim is white, compared to a factor of 2.3 if the defendant was
the prime mover and of 4.9 if the defendant had a prior capital conviction).
232. The Baldus study employed multiple regression analysis to isolate the possible effects of
racial factors, ultimately demonstrating their readily identifiable impact at a statistically
significant level. Specifically, the study determined that across the state, prosecutors elected to
pursue capital punishment in black-defendant/white-victim cases at nearly five times the rate of
black-defendant/black-victim cases (seventy percent of the time, compared to fifteen percent of
the time), and over three times the rate of white-defendant/black-victim cases (seventy percent
compared to nineteen percent). McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 356. The statistics for Fulton County were
consistent with the statewide findings, but necessarily involved fewer cases. Id.
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This article has provided a framework for understanding and
advancing the two most promising avenues for such a challenge: a claim
of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and an
equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of
these arguments, this article has demonstrated that a combination of the
ambiguous language and overbroad construction of Georgia's death-
penalty statute and the abuses of discretion among the state's district
attorneys have expanded the application of the death penalty beyond the
constitutionally required narrow range of especially extreme and heinous
murders. The article also has shown that the state supreme court's duty
to provide a proportionality review of death sentences is consistently
discharged in a perfunctory manner, such that the reviews completely
fail in the protective function that the U.S. Supreme Court envisioned
when it originally upheld Georgia's laws. As a result, this article has
established that, irrespective of the facial validity of Georgia's capital-
punishment scheme, the entire Georgia death-penalty statute is unconsti-
tutional as applied and therefore must be struck down.
